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Human Rights Quarterly 17.4 (1995) 618-648
A Psychohistorical Analysis of the Japanese American InternmentAlison Dundes Renteln *Poster ArtI. INTRODUCTIONOne of the most repressive actions ever taken by the US government was the incarceration (or "evacuation") 1 of Japanese Americans during World War II. Surprisingly, despite its obvious historical importance, this event has received only superficial psychological analysis. As a consequence, the accounts of this tragic episode remain somewhat incomplete. It is my purpose in this essay to explore some of the less obvious psychological motivations underlying this egregious failure to uphold the ideals of American society. In particular, through consideration of various historical documents I argue that a deeply rooted fear of sexual congress between the races consciously or unconsciously motivated some of the actions which led to the internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans. I wish to make clear that I am not claiming that other interpretations of this period in American history are invalid; many of the works in the voluminous literature on this subject put forth what are certainly contributing factors. Multiple and reinforcing reasons exist for any historical event. However, the most popular explanations (e.g., fear of Japanese American economic superiority coupled with racism and wartime hysteria) overlook the underlying causes of those fears. Although the race prejudice argument is compelling, the elements of this racism have not been sufficiently analyzed. To understand the racist forces at work, it is necessary to study the [End Page 618] sexual dimension of American racism. As I shall argue below, it was a combination of the ideas of eugenics and virulent racism that was partly responsible for the occurrence of one of America's worst civil liberties disasters. Following a brief historical overview comes a consideration of the standard explanations for the evacuation. There follows a brief discussion of the principles of eugenics and the resulting anti-miscegenation laws, and their applicability in this case. Next, I analyze the prevalent stereotypes and misperceptions of Japanese Americans with an eye towards their supposed sexual characteristics. I then provide some of the obvious contradictory evidence. The main argument comes in the sections on the psychohistorical approach and the role of projection. I argue that the entire incident may have been fueled by projection or "projective inversion" 2 on the part of the white population. This interpretation is substantiated by an analysis of prevalent stereotypes in popular culture and of the implementation of specific policies during the internment. However, it is important to acknowledge that it is difficult to prove the existence of unconscious motives; therefore, the evidence marshalled for their existence can only be indirect. II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEWSeventy-four days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt signed the infamous Executive Order 9066 that provided the government's sanction for the removal of Japanese Americans from their homes on the West Coast to camps in barren parts of California, Idaho, Utah, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, and Arkansas. 3 The proffered justification for the removal was military necessity. Over 100,000 Japanese Americans were placed in concentration camps. Nearly two-thirds of the internees were Nisei, 4 native-born American citizens. Half of those in the [End Page 619] camps were under the age of twenty-one. Approximately one quarter of those interned were young children and infants, and many internees were elderly. In some cases members of families were separated from each other. Conditions in the so-called relocation centers were harsh. Initially placed in these temporary assembly centers, the Japanese Americans were sheltered in what were simply race tracks, fairgrounds, and livestock pavilions converted for military purposes. In some cases it was a matter of a few days between the time that the animals were removed and the internees were herded into facilities which had a stench of manure. 5 The fact that the Japanese Americans were portrayed as animals in much of the World War II propaganda 6 may have helped convince the American public that inhumane treatment was acceptable. Roger Daniels has pointed out that college dormitories would soon have been available and, therefore, that: "[it] was probably more than the housing shortage that inspired them to select sites that had been intended to house livestock." 7 They remained in these filthy places in some cases for weeks and even months before being moved to the concentration camps. 8 Located on "godforsaken" sites 9 and surrounded by barbed wire, the concentration camps were hardly any more hospitable than were the assembly centers. Rooms twenty feet by twenty-four feet were designed to accommodate families with five to eight members; smaller families were assigned to rooms sixteen feet by twenty feet. 10 It is clear that the architects of the "evacuation" had little concern for privacy or family life. 11 The barracks were poorly constructed, giving the internees little protection against the elements. Temperatures were sometimes as low as thirty degrees below zero in the winter and as high as 130 fahrenheit in the summer; sandstorms and blizzards pierced the pine boards. 12 Bathrooms had no partitions and usually lacked hot water. The kitchens were unclean, 13 and the food was unpalatable. 14 Most oppressive perhaps, was having to suffer the humiliation of being treated like prisoners: "the sense of being debased [End Page 620] human beings was inescapable for a people being guarded night and day by soldiers up in guard towers." 15 Some lost their lives as well as their dignity. Historians have recorded instances when guards shot and killed internees. 16 Even children were sometimes targets. 17 Many Japanese Americans also lost their property. Because they received virtually no warning about the evacuation decision, many Japanese Americans were forced to try to sell their homes and businesses within a matter of days. This meant that they had to take whatever money was offered to them, or else abandon their property. They suffered further economic exploitation in the camps when some Japanese Americans served as cheap labor for the Caucasian personnel. 18 The Japanese Americans remained in the camps for several years, and in some cases until well after World War II was over. The overreaction of the US government and public merits further investigation. III. TREATMENT OF OTHER GROUPSIt is important to note that while there had been hostility toward German and Italian Americans, they were not incarcerated. During World War I German Americans were harassed. They witnessed the renaming of German foods, towns, and streets and suffered the banning of German music. 19 Language instruction in German was prohibited in the public schools. 20 Morton Grodzins, one of the earliest and most powerful critics of the evacuation, suggested that German Americans were distinguished from the Nazis and Italian Americans were distinguished from the Fascists. However, no differentiating nomenclature existed for the Japanese. 21 The type of racism directed towards the Japanese Americans was significantly different in character from that experienced by European Americans. California Attorney General Earl Warren, later a famous champion of civil rights as Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, argued that loyalty was racially based: [End Page 621] We believe that when we are dealing with the Caucasian race we have methods that will test the loyalty of them, and we believe that we can, in dealing with the Germans and the Italians, arrive at some fairly sound conclusions because of our knowledge of the way they live in the community and have lived for many years. But when we deal with the Japanese we are in an entirely different field and we cannot form any opinion that we believe to be sound. 22 The modern reader finds startling the absence of any major public outcry against the internment. 23 Critics of the public policy were indeed few, but there were some who had sympathy for Japanese Americans. 24 For instance, Governor Ralph Carr of Colorado offered to accept Japanese Americans and to protect their constitutional rights. 25 Most liberals, including Earl Warren, supported the decision to incarcerate Japanese Americans. Warren is said to have been one of the individuals most responsible for effecting the evacuation by convincing the West Coast Military Commander, General DeWitt, that the evacuation was necessary. [End Page 622] 26 Warren was himself popular at least in California where he won the California governorship in 1942 and was re-elected twice before becoming Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. 27 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also failed to mount a campaign against the evacuation. The membership of the ACLU was deeply divided over the question of whether it was desirable to bring any test cases. 28 Those who were against challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066 were apparently concerned about undermining Roosevelt's authority. In the end, the ACLU board instructed then Executive Director Roger Baldwin to inform West Coast affiliates that "local committees are not free to sponsor cases in which the position is taken that the government has no constitutional right to remove citizens from military areas." 29 The ACLU authorized only constitutional challenges to General DeWitt's orders based on racial grounds. If lawyers refused to comply with the policy, they would have to withdraw as ACLU counsel. Peter Irons emphasizes that "none of the lawyers who represented the Japanese Americans had the backing of the national ACLU." 30 He explains the ACLU failure to protect the rights of Japanese Americans by suggesting that it had more pressing agenda items, it wanted to support the war efforts against Nazism and Fascism, and it was based in New York, far from Japanese Americans on the west coast. [End Page 623] 31 The decision to remove the Japanese from the West Coast and to place them in concentration camps was a highly popular one and was upheld by the US Supreme Court. 32 With the benefit of hindsight, we know that it was completely unnecessary, because no acts of espionage ever occurred. How then can we account for this act in a country which espouses the doctrine of equal protection of the law? IV. STANDARD EXPLANATIONSIn most sources a triumvirate of reasons for the incarceration appear: wartime hysteria, economic motives, and race prejudice. In his research in the 1980s, Peter Irons demonstrated the failure in United States political leadership as an additional explanation for the Japanese American internment. 33 Irons showed that evidence proving the lack of any threat from the resident Japanese community was suppressed. Internal Justice Department memoranda indicate that the Alien and Enemy Control Unit withheld critical information from the Supreme Court. 34 In addition, the judiciary is ordinarily reluctant to challenge executive and military decision making. There were also paternalistic claims that Japanese Americans should be isolated for their own good. Since hostile citizens attempted to run them over and shoot at them in town, this might have seemed somewhat plausible. A. Wartime HysteriaMuch of the literature concentrates on the possibility of Fifth Column activity by the Japanese. This wartime hysteria argument is not without force. After all, Americans had been attacked at Pearl Harbor in a "sneak" attack, though not by Japanese Americans. Moreover, American tradition apparently countenances the suppression of civil liberties during wartime. [End Page 624] 35 Various characterizations of the Japanese were put forward at the time to substantiate the claim of subversive activity. For instance, Americans found the Japanese Americans to be seclusive. This was compounded by their language, which Americans could not easily understand. Though inaccurate, Americans attributed to the Japanese a religious fanaticism, evidenced by an obsessive worship of the Emperor who was the religious as well as the secular head of the nation. All of these cultural perceptions contributed to the assumption that Japanese Americans could not be trusted. Forced to make a choice, the argument went, they would remain loyal to Japan. The delusional nature of American thinking is illustrated by reports that Japanese Americans arranged their crops in a militarily suspect fashion: "Rumors about Japanese fields of flowers and vegetables planted 'arrowlike' pointing to nearby military installations reverberated through California and beyond." 36 B. Economic MotivesThe second standard explanation for the incarceration is that greedy Caucasian farmers wanted to eliminate economic competition. By 1910 Japanese Americans produced 70 percent of California strawberries, though they controlled less than 1 percent of the state's total farm acreage. 37 Although they owned only 1 percent of the cultivated land in California by 1919, Japanese Americans produced more than 10 percent of the state's total produce. 38 By the end of 1941, they controlled 42 percent of the commercial truck crops grown in California, 22 percent of the nation's total. Though they tilled only 3.9 percent of the state's farmland, they produced as much as 90 percent of California's artichokes, cauliflower, celery, cucumber, peppers, spinach, strawberries, and tomatoes. 39 The Japanese were known for having revolutionized California's fishing industry, introducing superior potato seed, and pioneering land reclamation. Indeed, Japanese Americans provided economic benefits to the public at large by lowering the cost of fresh produce for all. 40 Japanese Americans had been model citizens, fulfilling the American dream by moving from rags to riches. [End Page 625] 41 Caucasian farmers resented the success of the Japanese and were among the first to call for the evacuation. A number of special interest groups agitated for the removal of Japanese Americans. 42 Sometimes claims were made that Japanese used unfair or unethical business practices. For example, the American Legion produced the film, Shadows of the West, in which one Japanese character "controlled the statewide vegetable market over a wireless apparatus" and other Japanese "were shown dumping vegetables into the harbor to maintain high prices." 43 Whether or not the economic considerations were influential in the formulation of the evacuation policy, the result of the policy was a devastating loss for the Japanese Americans. 44 Almost all internees lost their homes, jobs, businesses, or farms. 45 Japanese Americans lost an estimated $400 million, of which only $40 million was returned in depreciated dollars. 46 A study conducted for the Wartime Relocation Commission noted that the economic losses of the internees might be as high as $6.2 billion in 1983 dollars with inflation and interest added. 47 Japanese Americans did receive compensation of $38 million under the Evacuation Claims Act of 1948. 48 But, the last payment made from that source was in 1965, and overall, they have received little in the way of compensation. Although the US government finally adopted the recommendation of the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 49 many elderly Japanese Americans died before they could receive the $20,000 in reparations authorized by Congress. 50 Although economic motivations played some part in the decision to relocate Japanese Americans, it seems unlikely that they were a dominant factor. Other less drastic ways existed by which an expropriation of Japanese American private assets might have been more easily accomplished. Furthermore, the way in which the concern over Japanese American farm products was often expressed reflects wartime hysteria and race prejudice. For example, a rumor circulated that Japanese farmers were lacing their produce with arsenic in order to poison American housewives. [End Page 626] 51 C. Race PrejudiceWhen race prejudice is mentioned as a motivating factor for the evacuation policy, it is seldom analyzed in any depth. Oblique reference is made to the entire tradition of anti-Asianism on the West Coast, but, apart from mere mention of the so-called "Yellow Peril," almost no incisive analysis of the role that racism played in the Japanese American incarceration can be found in the literature. 52 From the outset there was concern about the morality of Japanese immigrants and the threat that they posed to the purity of American women. The California nativist movement, after securing passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, turned to the issue of Japanese immigration. 53 The leader of the movement was Denis Kearney, himself a recent immigrant from Ireland. He argued that the Japanese who attended public school were: "fully developed men" who sought to "debauch their female classmates." 54 Other kinds of racist arguments were also advanced. One was that the Japanese had a racial predisposition to be saboteurs. 55 Another common fear was that other races would damage the germ plasm of the American (Caucasian) people. It is this issue of the relationship between eugenics and race that requires elucidation. V. EUGENICSSir Francis Galton coined the term eugenics in his 1883 work Inquiries into Human Faculty. 56 The pseudo-scientific theory of eugenics held that in order to protect the human race, defective genetic material should be removed from the world's "germ plasm." 57 This theory gained popularity in the early twentieth century, especially during the 1920s. The height of the movement was 1925 at which time it had taken on the attributes of a fad. [End Page 627] 58 The racist version of eugenics held that the "superior" races had to be protected from the "inferior" races. Wilson and Hosokawa give a lucid characterization of this doctrine: "Eugenics held that racial differences are established genetically and are relatively unchanging. Therefore, the influx of non-Nordics was dangerous to the racial purity of the original American stock; interbreeding with this inferior stock was tantamount to 'race suicide.'" 59 Haller, in his classic work, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought, suggests that it was, in fact, the racist aspect of eugenics which appealed to Americans: "In its racist side, eugenics perhaps touched most closely the thoughts and emotions of large groups of the American public. Eugenic concepts reached into the halls of Congress and state legislatures, sounded on the political hustings, and filled numerous popular books and articles." 60 Haller states that educated Americans since the 1930s "have generally looked with deep suspicion upon efforts to frame a hereditarian interpretation of human nature." 61 Even if one were to grant this sudden change of heart, educated Americans account for only a small proportion of the general population. Eugenics appears to have served as an ideological weapon for racists. It almost certainly contributed to the social acceptance of the Japanese American evacuation. Eugenics was not merely a dangerous theory. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, Galton and his followers argued that eugenic principles ought to be incorporated into various reform programs. 62 Eugenics provided the justification for various repressive public policies. It led to such significant policy proposals as restrictive immigration. The basic idea was that the United States should be protected against the influx of defective "germ plasm." Another policy which resulted from eugenics was state-imposed sterilization. 63 The US Supreme Court sanctioned the involuntary sterilization of "mentally feeble minded" persons in the landmark case of Buck v. Bell. 64 Since that time, thousands of Americans have been the victims of compulsory sterilization authorized under statutes based upon a model law that was also used by Hitler. In this country, those sterilized were primarily the [End Page 628] poor and unwed mothers. 65 Despite growing political opposition to eugenics, sterilizations continue to be performed in great numbers today. 66 VI. ANTI-MISCEGENATIONIntimately intertwined with eugenics and eugenicists was the enactment of anti-miscegenation statutes. 67 These statutes were explicitly designed to preserve the "racial integrity" of whites. 68 Initially the laws made it a crime for a black person to marry a white person, but subsequently, intermarriage between "mongolians" and Caucasians was prohibited as well. 69 Laws against racial intermarriage and intermixture date back to the early 1600s. 70 Franklin warned against allowing a "nation of mulattoes," while Jefferson maintained that the amalgamation of whites with other races "produces a degradation to which no lover of his country, no lover of excellence in human character can innocently consent." 71 [End Page 629] Eugenicists relied on pseudo-scientific arguments to confirm their view that race mixture was undesirable. 72 In a collection of university lectures by scientists from various disciplines a geneticist presented the standard view: The admixture of white blood clearly improves the offspring in mental efficiency but there is no evidence to indicate that such offspring is better in any way than the white parent, and it is reasonable to assume that they would be inferior. . . . Nothing would seem to the writer more regrettable than the general amalgamation of the races of the world. 73 Assertions were made that the offspring were more susceptible to certain diseases and were less moral. 74 Often an analogy was drawn to the animal world: The most superior individuals among cattle, horses and all domestic animals are those of pure breed, and the best breeders are strongly opposed to the crossing of breeds. The general inferiority of a mongrel lot is well recognised. 75[End Page 630] The phenomenon of hybrid vigor (the crossing of two species to produce a more viable amalgamation) was well known in the nineteenth century. To some Americans this provided some hope that intermarriage with immigrants would produce a superior people. However, this was challenged in the twentieth century. One point of view concerning interracial mixing was based on what nineteenth century agricultural breeders called reversions. A reversion refers to a hybrid from two domestic strains which appears to have the characteristics of a wild variety. Haller explains the kinds of arguments put forward by the proponents of this view: "closely related races (like the Nordic strains that produced the American type) could safely interbreed but . . . widely varying races (like Nordics and Mediterraneans, or whites and Negroes) should not be crossed, since the result would be a reversion to the lowest type. . . . Thus the analogy with agricultural breeding gave scientific support to an exaltation of racial purity that in fact had no scientific foundation." 76 One of the leading eugenicists, Paul Popenoe, expressed the commonly held belief that miscegenation was biologically wrong. 77 Because eugenics had an aura of scientific respectability and was discussed in technical language, this lent credence to the movement, despite the absence of any scientific support for its tenets. It should be noted that these ideas were discussed widely and publicly accepted. William Faulkner reportedly "contended with entire seriousness that the cross between the white man and the Negro woman always resulted, after the first crossing, in sterility." 78 One radio program in 1944 featured a debate about whether interracial mixing was biologically possible. 79 One side concluded: "It is because we feel that the Japanese, unlike all the rest of the races or peoples of the world are so fundamentally different that it's impossible to assimilate by intermarriage--which is necessary to have assimilation--which is not the case with the other races and religions of mankind. (Applause.)" 80 President Roosevelt himself was apparently imbued with eugenical notions. He asked an "idiosyncratic" Smithsonian anthropologist to "undertake a study of race-crossing of Asian and European stocks." 81 It has been [End Page 631] suggested that Roosevelt's racist assumptions may have made it easier for him to rationalize his decision to issue Executive Order 9066. 82 There was widespread acceptance of the notion that the preservation of the white race depended on protecting the purity of Caucasian women. In fact, race prejudice in the United States was based in large part on this idea. If males from other racial groups were to become involved with white women, then racial purity would be jeopardized. I contend that the internment decision, which removed all males of Japanese ancestry from American society, was partly motivated by concern over the alleged deleterious effects of interracial mixing. But, eugenics alone cannot account for the treatment received by the Japanese in particular. If Japanese American males were uninterested in Caucasian women, then concern about interracial mixing would have been unnecessary. Therefore, what was critical to ensure virtually universal acceptance of the internment policy were specific stereotypes of Japanese American males as being, among other things, hypersexual. VII. STEREOTYPES OF JAPANESE AMERICANSIn a highly perceptive but little cited study, From Japs to Japanese: The Evolution of Japanese-American Stereotypes, 83 Dennis Ogawa presents four major stereotypes of Japanese Americans: highly un-American, inferior citizens, sexually aggressive, and part of an international menace. 84 While all four may have influenced policy makers and the public, for the purposes of the argument advanced here, the two stereotypes of particular relevance are the notions that Japanese Americans are highly un-American and sexually aggressive. A. "Un-American"A common stereotype was that Japanese Americans were un-American. They were not and could never be properly assimilated into the American way of life. 85 An example of this perception is found in the testimony of V.S. McClatchy, a powerful figure in the Japanese Exclusion League who lobbied for an immigration law to exclude "Orientals:" [End Page 632] The Japanese are less assimilable and more dangerous as residents in this country than any other of the peoples ineligible under our laws . . . with great pride of race, they have no idea of assimilating in the sense of amalgamation. They do not come here with any desire or any intent to lose their racial or national identity. They come here specifically and professedly for the purpose of colonizing and establishing here permanently the proud Yamato race. They never cease being Japanese. 86 It is apparent that immigrants were expected to shed their prior cultural identity in order to become good citizens. General DeWitt also espoused the notion that the Japanese could not be assimilated. When he testified before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee in 1943 on the "relocation" of the Japanese, he said: A Jap's a Jap. They are a dangerous element, whether loyal or not. There is no way to determine their loyalty. . . . It makes no difference whether he is an American; theoretically he is still a Japanese and you can't change him. . . . You can't change him by giving him a piece of paper. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on U.S. soil, possessed of U.S. citizenship have become "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted. 87 The irony is that anti-miscegenation statutes, segregated schools, and other public policies legally prevented assimilation. By forcing the Japanese to inhabit a separate sphere and reinforcing group solidarity, whites facilitated their claims that Japanese harbored feelings of racial animosity. To the extent that the premise that loyalty is based on race (an innate and immutable characteristic) was accepted, there was no way to overcome such a deterministic argument. In The Valor of Ignorance, 88 a book analyzing the "Japanese problem" in California, Homer Lea claimed "a nation may be kept intact only so long as its ruling element remains homogeneous." 89 In the face of such public policies and ideology, it is no wonder that Japanese Americans were accused of being incapable of assimilation. B. Sexual AggressivenessThe stereotype that appears to have been most significant for the evacuation decision, though, was that of sexual aggressiveness. In general, Caucasians [End Page 634] have been concerned about the sexual prowess of male members of minority groups. Hypersexuality is attributed not only to Japanese Americans but to many other groups. 90 Ogawa suggests that there is a common pattern to ethnic and racial stereotyping: "One of the most visceral images in the Anglo mind is that of intercourse between a white woman and a man [End Page 635] of another race. Nothing strikes more at the white man's heart than his women being molested by Blacks, Browns, or Yellows." 91 Daniels and Kitano comment on this notion in passing: "The sex bugaboo, the ravishing of pure white women by lascivious Oriental men, had always lurked in the background of the anti-Oriental movements in California." 92 Chuman also mentions the stereotypes of the Japanese reinforced during a propaganda campaign in 1920: "They were accused of having a high birthrate, of being spies instead of farmers, of being sex fiends and rapists, and of mongrelizing white women." 93 Ogawa reaches the same conclusion with respect to the stereotype of the Japanese male: "Driven by a beastly sexual urge, the Jap would endanger the white female and the purity of the Anglo American stock." 94 Spickard agrees that "[t]he idea of a sexual threat from Japanese men loomed large in many White men's minds." 95
It is not possible to grasp the subtleties of race prejudice
in the United
States
without recognizing that what is at stake is white women and
thereby racial
purity.
96
It was precisely the trait of sexual aggressiveness
that
led Caucasians to be suspicious of Japanese Americans.
Considerable evidence exists that the stereotype of the
lascivious
Japanese male
was readily accessible to most Americans. Some examples come
from the
press, such
as the following 1920 editorial in the San Francisco
Chronicle, at
the
time considered the most influential paper on the West
Coast:
97
[End Page 636]
Headlines reinforced the imagery pattern, for example, "Jap
Attacks Girl,
Beaten
by Mother."
99
Roger Daniels, in The Politics of
Prejudice,
cites a few "menacing headlines" which were part of the 1905
campaign by
the
San Francisco Chronicle: "Japanese a Menace to
American Women" and
"The
Yellow Peril--How Japanese Crowd Out the White Race."
100
John Dower provides additional evidence of the sexual images
associated
with
Japanese males in popular culture: "Without question . . .
the most common
caricature of the Japanese by Westerners, writers and
cartoonists alike,
was the
monkey or ape."
105
In Christian iconography the ape symbolizes
lust,
106
which would seem to explain why this particular bestial
symbol captured the attention of Americans.
Films during this period also conveyed the message that
Japanese men
wanted white
women. In The Cheat (1914), a white woman offers to
become the
mistress of
a Japanese man to procure needed funds but later reneges on
her promise.
This
leads the Japanese
107
to acts of sadism: "The Oriental, furious,
brands her on the shoulder. The husband is brought to trial
for having
attempted
to kill the Japanese. The wife bares her branded shoulder in
court and
wins her
husband's acquittal."
108
The film provoked strong protests
from
Japanese Americans. One actor, in particular, complained
that Asian actors
were
cast in roles calculated to stimulate race hatred.
109
After the outbreak of World War I, with China and Japan on
the side of the
Allies, films began to portray Asians somewhat more
sympathetically.
110
[End Page 638]
There were, however, some reversions to the
stereotype, such as the 1916 motion picture, Patria,
by the
International
Film Corporation, part of the Hearst empire. Part of the
story line was
that
"Japanese troops invaded California, committing appropriate
atrocities
[notably
the attempted rape of the heroine]."
111
Another exception to the generally more positive depictions
was Shadows
of the
West (1920). This diatribe was released by the American
Legion as part
of its
campaign for an alien land law:
Even films that portrayed the Japanese in a more sympathetic
light
would not
sanction interracial union because of "the American taboo
that Asian men
must not
touch white women."
113
One Japanese actor, Sessue Hayakawa,
whose
career began with villain roles (e.g., The Cheat),
was "the only
Oriental
actor ever to play romantic leads in Americans films."
114
However, "he always had to relinquish the girl in the final
reel."
115
Ten Broeck, Barnhart, and Matson argue that after three
decades of
anti-Japanese
agitation, the negative stereotype "was firmly embedded in
the public
consciousness and no longer depended for its existence upon
the prodding of
'pressure groups.'"
116
The bombing of Pearl Harbor provided
Americans
with an excuse for acting on the anti-Japanese feelings they
had held for
decades.
117
[End Page 639]
The image of the sexually voracious Japanese was expressed
not only in
popular
culture, but by policy makers and the public as well. One of
the most
common
statements made about Japanese Americans was that they had a
high breeding
rate
and therefore posed a threat to the "purity of the Anglo
race."
118
For
example, the exclusionist McClatchy stated: "the biological
fecundity of
the
Japanese is so great that in a limited time, I think 64
years, the entire
state
will be Japanese."
119
On 20 January 1942, Dr. W.R. Livingstone
in a
speech in Oxnard, California warned that "unless adequate
preventive
measures are
enforced, the Japs will eventually overrun California and
the Pacific
Coast
just as the rabbits, brought to Australia, have
[End Page 640]
overrun that
Island."
120
The allegation that Japanese "breed like rabbits"
is one
which recurred.
121
This view of the Japanese led to various policy
recommendations. Among
these was
the suggestion that Japanese be offered a choice between
sterilization or
deportation.
122
Another was that relocation camps be segregated
by sex
so that they would not become "breeding farms."
123
Actually, American public policy had been designed to
prevent a population
increase among Japanese immigrants. Between 1900 and 1920
Japanese American
immigrants were primarily male. Approximately one-seventh of
the 214,000
immigrants were female.
124
Because there was a shortage of
women,
because anti-miscegenation laws precluded any possibility of
intermarriage, and
because ingroup marriage was preferred in Japanese culture,
125
Japanese men sought to bring Japanese women to the United
States. This led
to an
innovation in the traditional practice of arranged marriage.
"Picture
brides"
were matched through correspondence to Japanese men in the
United States.
Perhaps
surprisingly, the McClatchy newspapers and politicians
launched a campaign
against the "picture brides," as a consequence of which the
Japanese
government
ceased the issuance of passports to them in 1920.
126
One can
conjecture that this was because the fear of a high birth
rate was more
intense
than the fear of interracial mixing. Another possibility is
that the
authorities
wished to ensure that the Japanese not settle permanently in
the United
States.
127
Once the immigration policy changed and Japanese
women
arrived, Japanese American men were able to marry and start
families.
Because
many children were then born, this might have contributed to
the
impression that
Japanese Americans were fecund.
128
Many of the prevalent beliefs about the Japanese were
clearly unfounded.
For
instance, Japanese were hardly invading the United States.
There were fewer
Japanese immigrants than other ethnic groups. Japanese
represented less
than one
percent of the immigrant population.
129
Their birth
[End Page 641]
rate was
also not
particularly high: by 1940 in every West Coast state the
birthrate was
lower than
that of the general population.
130
Another false perception was that Japanese men preferred
Caucasian women.
This is
as unlikely as it is racist. Hosokawa relates an amusing
story from the
1860s on
this issue. An American woman asked a Japanese officer
whether
American or
Japanese women were "superior." He replied: "'American
ladies are the more
beautiful of the two with their fair complexions.' But he
noted in his
diary,
'she and her companions looked well-pleased. They must be of
a very
believing
nature.'"
131
It seems unlikely that Japanese men sought
Caucasian
women because the Japanese have been described as one of the
most exclusive
ethnic groups with a very low rate of intermarriage with
other ethnic
groups.
132
While there is, of course, a difference between
interracial
sex and interracial marriage, it is possible that Japanese
men were, in
general,
not all that interested in Caucasian women. Despite the
falsity of the
perceptions, stereotypes of Japanese American men as
sexually aggressive
might
have influenced decisionmaking at the time of the Japanese
American
internment.
VIII. RACISM AND THE PSYCHOHISTORICAL APPROACH
The psychohistorical approach provides a way of
understanding why the
evacuation
was such a popular policy. By analyzing the pervasive
stereotypes of the
Japanese
that were circulating in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth
centuries, it
becomes possible to gain insight into the worldview of
actors in the
1940s. The
approach suggests that attention ought to be placed on the
psychological
motivations, conscious or unconscious, of historical actors.
133
One of
the central concepts for psychohistory is the group fantasy.
134
The
question is whether there is sufficient evidence of a white
fantasy
about
Japanese men to suggest that it might have affected policy
makers at the
time of
the evacuation.
[End Page 642]
In the case of racism, a number of analysts have generally
argued that it
has a
sexual component. Racism, it is argued, is based on
unresolved sexual
conflicts and, in particular, the Oedipal complex. In their
provocative
work, Race and Psychiatry, Alexander Thomas and
Samuel Sillen
devote a
chapter to "the Sexual Mystique" in which they evaluate the
standard view:
"In
examining the professional literature, we find that much of
it is
dominated
by the view that the vicissitudes and conflicts of sexuality
provide
the
basic motive of racism."
135
They deny that all race prejudice
stems
from Oedipal conflicts because this is an overly
deterministic
approach.
Acceptance of this approach would mean that it would be
impossible to
bring about
social change unless human beings evolved to the point that
they were no
longer
afflicted with the Oedipal conflict.
136
They do not,
however, reject the possibility that sexual conflicts might
be
related to
racism: "Rejection of the theory that sexual conflict is the
root
cause of
racism does not negate the influence of sexual problems on
racial
attitudes
in some people. Far from it. An individual with sexual
anxieties may
elaborate
and exploit racist stereotypes to ameliorate his personal
problem."
137
The basic argument is that "race violence is . . .
intimately linked to the
white man's sexual fantasies."
138
Most historical
analysis of
race relations concentrates on either black/white or Native
American/white
relationships. Nevertheless, the Caucasian view of
minorities appears to
follow a
common pattern. Frequently hypersexuality is ascribed to the
males of an
ethnic
group, just as a high birth rate is attributed to the group
as a whole.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to take these insights and
apply them to
the
Japanese/Caucasian relationship.
The act of defining the sexual character of ethnic groups,
particularly
males, is a political act. Thomas and Sillen make this point
eloquently:
"the
symbols of sexuality have been unceasingly manipulated to
justify
oppression and
to fan fear and hatred."
139
Arguably, this is the process that
helped
lead to the "evacuation."
[End Page 642]
A. Projection
To identify a pattern is one step; interpretation of the
pattern that has
been
discerned is the next. It is my view that the Caucasian
fantasy of
minority males
preying upon white women is in reality a classic example of
[End Page 643]
projection.
Projection is a psychological device by means of which
desires or
anxieties are
displaced onto another individual or group.
140
In this case
white
males actually desire Japanese women but because of
prevailing eugenical
notions
and other ideological forces cannot admit this and therefore
project their
sexual
wishes onto Japanese men who, according to the
fantasy, want white
women.
Paul R. Spickard, in a major study of interracial
relationships, contends
that
Caucasian men have been fascinated by Japanese American
women and "[their]
image
of exotic sensuality."
141
He states: "Japanese women came to be
seen
by many American men as exotic, erotic creatures able to
please men in
special
ways."
142
This point often has been made in the context of slavery.
Slave owners
often took
advantage of female slaves but executed any black male
suspected of paying
attention to a white woman.
143
Gordon Allport in his classic
work,
The Nature of Prejudice, explains projection in the
context of
black/white
relationships:
Or suppose the white male has taken his pleasure with Negro
women. Such
liaisons,
being illicit, give rise to guilt. A wry sense of justice
forces him to
see that
the Negro males, in principle, should have equal access to
white women.
Jealousy
plus guilt create a disagreeable conflict. He, too, finds a
way
out by
[End Page 644]
"projecting." It is the lecherous Negro male that is the
real menace. He
would
deflower white womanhood. The deflowering of Negro womanhood
is
conveniently forgotten in the outburst of righteous
indignation. The
indignation
is guilt-evading and restorative of self-respect.
144
Allport suggests that such psychological processes result in
unjust legal
policy.
145
He states that blacks have received
disproportionately
harsh penalties for sex transgressions with white women,
despite the fact
that
whites are responsible for most transgressions. He cites
statistics for
the years
1938 to 1948 in thirteen southern states in which fifteen
whites and
187
blacks were executed for rape.
146
Specific relocation camp rules reveal the projective
mechanism at
work. An
article by Paul Spickard, Injustice Compounded:
Amerasians and
Non-Japanese
Americans in World War II Concentration Camps, provides
some data on
the
treatment of interracial couples during the internment. A
number of
non-Japanese
Americans, specifically the husbands and wives of Japanese
and
hundreds of
children of interracial couples, were incarcerated.
147
Eventually it
was decided that interracial couples could leave the camps
provided that
they had
minor children. The policy objective was to provide
Amerasian children
with the
opportunity to be reared in a "non-Japanese" environment.
Spickard
discovered
that "there was a not-so-subtle sexism that went with the
racism in this
selection system."
148
Children whose fathers were white and
mothers
were Japanese were permitted to return to the west coast,
according to
Spickard,
because their homes were sufficiently "American." If,
however,
children had
white mothers and Japanese fathers, they could leave the
camps, but could
not go
home to the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command.
Spickard suggests
that
was because their fathers made them "more than half
Japanese."
I disagree with Spickard and would argue that the reason for
the
differential
treatment of mixed offspring actually reveals a classic
instance of
projection at
work. This differential policy appears to have been
formulated on the
basis of
the group fantasy discussed above. Sexual liaisons between
[End Page 645 ] Japanese males
and
white females were socially unacceptable and were,
therefore, to be
punished.
The landmark case of Korematsu v. United States,
149
in
which
the US Supreme Court held that the evacuation order was
constitutional,
fits
the imagery pattern of the group fantasy. Fred Korematsu
defied the
evacuation order to remain with his fiancee, Ida Boitano, a
Caucasian
woman.
150
There is, of course, no way of proving that the
Justices in
the majority were consciously or unconsciously influenced to
any
degree by
either eugenics or a general fear of interracial mixing. But
given the
pervasive
stereotypes in popular culture and political rhetoric, it is
conceivable
that
some members of the Court might have been affected by the
common group
fantasy.
It is interesting that Korematsu challenged the order at a
time in
California
history when he could not have married his fiancee in any
case.
California's
anti-miscegenation statute was not struck down until 1948 in
Perez v.
Sharp.
151
The US Supreme Court finally rejected all
anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia.
152
There have been many attempts to explain one of the most
frightening
abuses of
state power in the history of the United States. In this
essay I have
offered one
interpretation of the event, drawing upon parts of the
historical record.
In
particular, I have tried to show that racial stereotypes of
Japanese
Americans,
especially the stereotype of sexual aggressiveness, might
have provided a
motivation (albeit unconscious) for the decision to
incarcerate them.
Japanese
males, according to the white group fantasy outlined above,
were eager to
prey on
Caucasian women. Therefore, to protect the purity of white
women, Japanese
Americans were sequestered. While it is not
[End Page 646]
possible to prove the extent
to which
group fantasies themselves directly motivate actors or
influence
events, the
existence of a collective fantasy must have some
significance.
Insofar as
images of Japanese men pervaded popular culture and captured
public
attention,
they might have been at least a contributing factor in the
internment.
It is certainly true that the Japanese are not the sole
objects of racial
discrimination by European Americans. Other minority groups
have suffered
the
consequences as well. Furthermore, the idea of internment of
racial groups
is not
a new one. In response to a few reports of bubonic plague in
Chinatown in
San
Francisco at the turn of the century, thousands of Chinese
Americans were
placed
in quarantine for several months. They were then induced,
along with many
Japanese Americans, to receive inoculations of a hazardous
experimental
vaccine.
153
Yet, it is possible that the Japanese arouse greater racial
hatred than
other
minority groups. After all, the United States has dropped
atomic bombs
only on
Japan. Furthermore, economic competition with Japan in the
1980s elicited
some
extraordinarily hostile responses. For example, unemployed
automotive
workers in
Detroit brutally killed Vincent Chin because they mistakenly
believed he
was
Japanese.
154
Even if there were greater animosity toward the Japanese, it
would not
mean that
other groups could never be victimized in the same fashion.
It might
depend upon
a mere historical accident, such as a national emergency.
For instance,
when
Americans were being held hostage in Iran, placing Iranian
students under
surveillance in the United States was discussed as an
option. In response
to the
AIDS epidemic, there has also been concern that the
government might
quarantine
homosexuals.
155
In 1991, when the United States waged war
against
Iraq, the FBI questioned many Arab Americans, supposedly in
order to thwart
terrorist activities.
156
It
[End Page 647]
would be wrong to assume that a
mass
internment could never happen again.
157
The lesson we must draw from the Japanese internment is that
civil rights
and
civil liberties are vulnerable. Even a political system with
checks and an
extremely strong judiciary will not always champion those
rights
successfully.
The Justices of the US Supreme Court are themselves
prisoners of culture.
Thus,
judicial review might not suffice to prevent powerful,
negative
stereotypes
from shaping public policy.
Another insight gained from the study of the Japanese
American internment
is that
villainy is not only to be found abroad. It might be argued
that the United
States obsessive concern with assimilation almost resulted
in the cultural
genocide of Americans of Japanese ancestry. Even though the
US government
did not
actually exterminate the Japanese Americans (although there
was fear that
it
might),
158
the policy of internment certainly resulted in the
devaluation of Japanese culture. To give but one example,
internees, out
of a
sense of shame, often chose not to discuss their ancestry
with their
children.
Although the United States, decades later, issued an apology
as well as
$20,000
checks, it can never repair the damage that was done.
It is crucial that scholars and politicians recognize the
powerful effect
of
stereotypes. Stereotypes should be subjected to much closer
political
scrutiny so
that it becomes clear how they are mobilized to legitimize
inhumane
policies.
Because stereotypes are not always consciously articulated,
it might be
necessary
to adopt an historical approach. The written record is
replete with
examples of
racist thought that cannot be assumed to have disappeared.
When these
racial
stereotypes are part of a group fantasy, they may be even
more
influential.
Group fantasies are an important subject for further
scholarly research.
They are
particularly dangerous because they are unconscious. If the
psychohistorical
approach can reveal some of the underlying forces that shape
public
policy, it
deserves further consideration. If and when the existence of
projective
inversion
is identified, it might help to demonstrate the falsity of
our
perceptions.
And it is only by constantly reexamining our perceptions
that we can avoid
repeating the tragic mistakes of the past.
* I would like to thank
Erwin Chemerinsky, Francesca Frey, Darrell
Hamamoto,
Bert Lockwood, Jr., and Michael Rogin for reading the essay
closely and
giving me
helpful criticisms.
Alison Dundes Renteln is Associate Professor,
Department of Political
Science, University of Southern California; B.A.
Harvard-Radcliffe, History and
Literature; Ph.D. in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, Boalt
Hall, University of
California, Berkeley 1987; J.D. University of Southern
California 1991.
2.
ALAN DUNDES, INTERPRETING FOLKLORE 33-61 (1980). Projection
refers to a
direct on-to-one translation of a thought or wish onto an
outward screen.
In
psychoanalytic parlance, it also refers to an inversion
where, according to
Freud, "I hate him," becomes "He hates me." It is this later
process which
Dundes
terms "projective inversion." A boy's Oedipal wish to
eliminate his father
is
expressed through projective inversion in myth as fathers
(kings) trying
to get
rid of their sons. In this article I am using projection to
refer to
projective
inversion. See id.
3.
In view of the existence of elaborate historical treatments
of the
evacuation, I will not rehearse all the facts but merely set
the stage for
the
analysis. Those interested in fuller accounts are urged to
consult the
literature. See, e.g., ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION
CAMPS USA:
JAPANESE-AMERICANS AND WWII (1971); RICHARD DRINNON, KEEPER
OF
CONCENTRATION
CAMPS: DILLON S. MYER AND AMERICAN RACISM (1987); MICHI
WEGLYN, YEARS OF
INFAMY
(1976).
4.
A Nisei is a second generation Japanese American immigrant.
5.
JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE
PACIFIC WAR 82
(1986); WEGLYN, supra note 3, at 80.
6.
DOWER, supra note 3, at 82.
7.
DANIELS, supra note 3, at 88.
8.
DOWER, supra note 5, at 82.
9.
DANIELS, supra note 3, at 96.
10.
WEGLYN, supra note 3, at 84.
11.
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES 73 (1983); DANIELS, supra note 3, at
109.
12.
James G. Trager, Haunting Echoes of the Last Round Up:
"9066"
Revisited 12 PERSP. CIV. RTS. Q. 8, 12 (1980). WEGLYN,
supra
note 3,
at 84.
13.
DANIELS, supra note 3, at 89.
14.
WEGLYN, supra note 3, at 81.
15.
Id. at 79.
16.
For more detail concerning these incidents, see HARRY KITANO
&
ROGER
DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICANS: EMERGING MINORITIES 62 (1988);
DRINNON,
supra
note 3, at 43; DANIELS, supra note 3, at 108.
17.
WEGLYN, supra note 3, at 295.
18.
DRINNON, supra note 3, at 47.
19.
DILLON S. MYER, UPROOTED AMERICANS: THE JAPANESE AMERICANS
AND THE WAR
RELOCATION AUTHORITY DURING WORLD WAR II, at 26 (1971).
20.
Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
21.
BILL HOSOKAWA, NISEI: THE QUIET AMERICANS 28, 247 (1969).
22.
Earl Warren, The Testimony of Attorney General Earl
Warren, in
RACISM IN CALIFORNIA: A READER IN THE HISTORY OF OPPRESSION
159 (Roger
Daniels
& Spencer C. Olin, Jr. eds., 1972); HOSOKAWA,
supra note 21, at
287-88.
23.
Another striking fact is that Hawaii refrained from
isolating Japanese
Americans. See Warm M. McAfree, America's Two
Japanese-American
Policies During World War II, 69 S. CAL. Q. 151-64
(1987). See
also
GARY Y. OKIRO, CANE FIRES: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN
HAWAII (1991).
Despite
the proximity of the Hawaiian Islands to naval bases and air
stations, the
Japanese were not interned. Supposedly the Japanese were
considered too
important
for the local economy. See Trager, supra note
12, at 10.
There was
no impending gubernatorial election, as there was for Earl
Warren. In
addition to
economic and political explanations, there is the
possibility that ethnic
differences were simply more widely accepted. Finally, the
military
commander is
reported to have been more open minded.
The greatest support for the Japanese Americans came from
the Quakers and
the
Southern California affiliate of the ACLU. See, e.g.,
DANIELS,
supra note 3, at 78; WEGLYN, supra note 3, at
104-05. Even
the
Communist Party, which had a few Japanese American members,
expelled them
and
supported the internment. See, e.g., DAVID J. O'BRIEN
& STEPHEN
FUGITA, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 47-48 (1991).
24.
For critics, see CALEB FOOTE, OUTCASTS! THE STORY OF
AMERICA'S
TREATMENT
OF HER JAPANESE-AMERICAN MINORITY (1944); MORTON GRODZINS,
AMERICANS
BETRAYED:
POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION (1949); Eugene V.
Rostow, The
Japanese
American Cases--A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489-533 (1945);
Eugene V.
Rostow,
Our Worst Wartime Mistake, HARPER'S MAG. 191, 193-201
(1945); Carey
McWilliams, Can the Japanese Be Assimilated into the
American Way of
Life?
10 TOWN MEETING 1-23 (1994).
25.
Trager, supra note 12, at 10.
26.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 11 (1983); ROBERT
A. WILSON
& BILL HOSOKAWA, EAST TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE
JAPANESE IN THE
UNITED
STATES 290 (1980).
Many have tried to understand Warren's involvement in the
evacuation,
termed "the
biggest discontinuity" in his career. James J. Rawls, The
Earl Warren
Oral
History Project: An Appraisal, 56 PAC. HIST. REV. 95
(1987). It has
been
suggested that Warren's subsequent activism on behalf of
civil rights
might have
been motivated by his recognition of the regrettable and
decisive role he
played
in promoting the evacuation. One journalist speculated that
"the Nisei may
have
paid the ransom that finally liberated the blacks." WILSON
&
HOSOKAWA, supra.
Warren, according to one biography, "acquired his town's
(Bakersfield)
xenophobic dislike of Orientals." The red light district in
Bakersfield was
called "Jap Alley." SCHWARTZ, supra at 8. For many
years Warren had
actively participated in the Native Sons of the Golden West,
a racist
organization, which advocated the exclusion of Japanese from
American
citizenship. Id. at 11. And it was during his first
campaign
for
governor of California that he supported the evacuation
policy. Id.
at 10.
He went to great lengths to avoid criticism of the policy.
In fact,
according to
a relative of Morton Grodzins, Warren actually intervened at
the
University of
California Press to prevent the publication of Grodzins'
doctoral
dissertation
Americans Betrayed. Personal Communication, Ann
Lipow, Librarian,
University of California, Berkeley, Summer 1990. Grodzins'
dissertation
was later
published by the University of Chicago Press.
While he lived, Warren never issued any sort of apology. In
his memoirs,
which
were published posthumously, he finally offered one: "I have
since
deeply
regretted the removal order and my own testimony in
advocating it, because
it was
not in keeping with our American concept of freedom and the
rights of
citizens."
Id. at 113. Apparently, he felt great remorse.
According to one
source,
during one interview: "Warren begins to weep as he describes
the faces of
the
children separated from their parents by relocation." Rawls,
supra
at 96.
For an interesting attempt to explain Warren's involvement
in the
evacuation and
belated apology, see Edward G. White, The Unacknowledged
Lesson: Earl
Warren
and the Japanese Relocation Controversy, 55 VA. Q. REV.,
613-629
(1979).
White emphasizes the fact that Warren grew up when powerful
racist
stereotypes
were prevalent on the West Coast. Id. at 617.
27.
Trager, supra note 12, at 15.
28.
For details, see IRONS, supra note 11.
29.
Id. at 130.
30.
Id. at 132.
31.
Id. at 133-34.
32.
The three internment cases were: Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); and
Korematsu v.
United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). For a thorough discussion of
the
constitutional
issues at stake, see Lorraine K. Bannai & Dale Minami,
Internment
During
World War II and Litigations, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE
SUPREME
COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 755-88 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992). For a
detailed
description
of the internment cases and the coram nobis petitions
to vacate
their
convictions, see Joanne Hirase, The Internment of
Japanese Americans:
The
Constitutional Threat Fifty Years Later, 19 J. CONTEMP.
L. 143-183
(1993).
33.
IRONS, supra note 11.
34.
Id.
35.
See generally, PAUL L. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
(1972); PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN
THE
UNITED STATES (1979).
36.
Trager, supra note 12, at 10. For example, Roger
Daniels cites a
headline "Caps on Japanese Tomato Plants Point to Air Base."
DANIELS,
supra note 3, at 33.
37.
HOSOKAWA, supra note 22, at 66.
38.
IRONS, supra note 11, at 10.
39.
Trager, supra note 12, at 12.
40.
DANIELS, supra note 3, at 9.
41.
Success Story: Outwhiting the Whites, NEWSWEEK, 21
June 1971, at
24-25. This article emphasizes the Horatio Alger theme and
shows the
persistence
of this perception of Japanese Americans.
42.
Some Caucasian farmers "made no secret of the fact that they
had axes
to
grind that had little to do with national security." IRONS,
supra
note 11,
at 39.
43.
DENNIS M. OGAWA, FROM JAPS TO JAPANESE: THE EVOLUTION OF
JAPANESE-AMERICAN STEREOTYPES 14 (1971).
44.
LEONARD BROOM & RUTH RIEMER, REMOVAL AND RETURN: THE
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON JAPANESE-AMERICANS 4 (1949).
45.
Trager, supra note 12, at 9.
46.
Id. at 15; WEGLYN, supra note 3.
47.
Alec Dubro, The Japanese-American Internment, 7 CAL.
LAW. 24, 32
(1986).
48.
DANIELS, supra note 3, at 168-69.
49.
O'BRIEN & FUGITA, supra note 23, at 81.
50.
This was noted in many newspaper articles.
51.
HARRY KITANO, THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS 37 (1987).
52.
But see OGAWA, supra note 43.
53.
IRONS, supra note 11, at 9.
54.
Id. at 10.
55.
Id. Bob Kumamoto, The Search for Spies: American
Counterintelligence and the Japanese-American Community
1931-1942, 6
AMERASIA
J. 47 (1979).
56.
MARK H. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT
212
n.1 (1984); PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY
123 (1977);
MICHAEL
OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE
1960S TO
THE 1980S 59 (1986).
57.
Even before the eugenics movement began formally, similar
"nativist"
and
"progressive" ideas were circulating. As early as 1791,
Henry Cabot Lodge,
a
prominent Bostonian and Republican, urged his fellow
Congressmen "to
protect the
blood of the nation from the contamination of 'inferior'
racial strains by
passing a bill to limit the influx of immigrants." HALLER,
supra
note
56, at 55-56; DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE
PROGRESSIVES (1968).
58.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS
AND OTHER
ESSAYS 33 (1966).
59.
WILSON & HOSOKAWA, supra note 26, at 132-33.
60.
HALLER, supra note 56, at 159.
61.
Id.
62.
Reilly, supra note 56, at 123.
63.
PICKENS, supra note 57.
64.
274 U.S. 200 (1927). For a discussion of Justice Holmes'
commitment to
eugenics, see Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a
Eugenic
Reformer:
Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 833-67
(1986).
65.
See Dick Grosboll, Sterilization Abuse: Current
State of the
Law and Remedies for Abuse, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
1147-89 (1980).
See
also Adele Clarke, Subtle Forms of Sterilization
Abuse: A
Reproductive
Rights Analysis, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR
MOTHERHOOD
188-212 (Rita
Arditti et al. eds., 1984).
66.
Reilly, supra note 56, at 126.
67.
Miscegenation is a term that has negative and emotional
overtones. For
an interesting discussion of its etiology, see ALEXANDER
THOMAS &
SAMUEL
SILLEN, RACISM AND PSYCHIATRY 111 (1979). Despite its
pejorative
connotations, it
continues to be the term used in the literature.
Haller notes that by the time the eugenicists became
politically active,
twenty-eight states had already banned interracial marriage
and that few
such
marriages occurred in other states. HALLER, supra
note 56, at 158.
Consequently, eugenicists did not see the need to lobby for
legislation of
this
kind.
68.
Reilly, supra note 56, at 135.
69.
Megumi Dick Osumi, Asians and California's
Anti-Miscegenation Laws,
in ASIAN AND PACIFIC AMERICAN EXPERIENCES: WOMEN'S
PERSPECTIVES 1-37
(Nobuya
Tsuchida ed., 1982). See also PAUL R. SPICKARD, MIXED
BLOOD:
INTERMARRIAGE
AND ETHNIC IDENTITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 70 (1989).
70.
DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 53-81
(1980);
Everett V. Stonequist, Race Mixture and the Mulatto,
in RACE
RELATIONS AND
THE RACE PROBLEM: A DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS 252 (Edgar T.
Thompson ed.,
1939);
Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A
Constitutional and Social
Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49-61 (1964); Lloyd D. Riley,
Miscegenation
Statutes--A Re-evaluation of their Constitutionality in
Light of Changing
Social
and Political Conditions, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 28-48
(1958); Andrew D.
Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of
Miscegenation
Statutes, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 208-22 (1956).
71.
RONALD T. TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 50 (1979). This was somewhat hypocritical because
Jefferson is
believed
to have had children with a slave mistress. B. R. Burg,
The Rhetoric of
Miscegenation: Thomas Jefferson, Sally Hemings, and Their
Historians 47
PHYLON 128-38 (1986); KENNETH KARST, MISCEGENATION:
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1266 (1986).
72.
American writers Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant revived
the
discredited racist theories of the French Count Gobineau to
lend "a veneer
of
scholarly sanction to the image of the yellow peril."
JACOBUS TEN BROECK
ET AL.,
PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1954). Their
obsession with the
threat
posed to the Nordic races by Asians received considerable
attention.
Madison Grant urged: "[t]he laws against miscegenation must
be greatly
extended
if the higher races are to be maintained." He advised the
Virginia
legislature to
forbid marriage of a white person to another person with any
trace "of
blood
other than Caucasian." HALLER, supra note 56, at 159.
In 1924 the
state
adopted a white supremacist law which was not overturned by
the US Supreme
Court
until Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
In his introduction to Lothrop Stoddard's book, The
Rising Tide of Color
Against White World-Supremacy, Grant wrote: "Democratic
ideals among an
homogeneous population of Nordic blood, as in England or
America, is one
thing,
but it is quite another for the white man to share his blood
with, or
intrust his
ideals to, brown, yellow, black, or red men." LOTHROP
STODDARD, THE RISING
TIDE
OF COLOR AGAINST WHITE WORLD-SUPREMACY xxxii (1920). In his
own book,
The
Passing of the Great Race, originally published in 1918,
Grant
expressed
regret that Nordic influence had declined in the United
States and in
Europe. MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1970)
(originally
published
1918).
73.
H.T. Webber, Eugenics from the Point of View of the
Geneticist,
in EUGENICS: TWELVE UNIVERSITY LECTURES 164, 166 (Morton
A. Aldrich et
al.
eds., 1914).
74.
Id. at 164.
75.
Id. at 167. The term "mongrel" is frequently
encountered in the
literature and reflects the contempt displayed toward the
offspring of
interracial unions.
Oddly though, despite Webber's apparent disdain for the
"half breed" whose
"viciousness . . . is notorious in literature and
experience" he concludes
that
"[t]he Mongolian-Caucasian cross so far as I am informed
cannot be
considered
inferior but is certainly to be pitied." Id. at 168.
It is interesting to note that the term Mongolian is
etymologically
related to
the disorder known as mongolism or mongolian idiocy, the
latter so named
because
of the perceived resemblance of persons with certain genetic
abnormalities
to
persons belonging to the so-called Mongoloid races. This
unfortunate
nomenclature
has undoubtedly contributed to the racist predispositions of
many.
76.
HALLER, supra note 56, at 148-49.
77.
PICKENS, supra note 57, at 97.
78.
JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATTOES IN
THE UNITED
STATES 97 (1980).
79.
McWilliams et al., supra note 24.
80.
McWilliams et al., supra note 24, at 18. See
also ROGER
DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE
1850 117
(1988).
81.
Geoffrey S. Smith, Racial Nativism and Origins of
Japanese American
Relocation, in JAPANESE-AMERICANS: FROM RELOCATION TO
REDRESS 84 (Roger
Daniels et al. eds., 1986).
82.
Id.
83.
OGAWA, supra note 43.
84.
Id. at 8.
85.
SPICKARD, supra note 69, at 35.
86.
ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE 99 (1977).
87.
OGAWA, supra note 43, at 11 (emphasis added).
88.
The book was first published in 1909 and reissued just after
Pearl
Harbor with "much fanfare." DANIELS, supra note 86,
at 72.
89.
OGAWA, supra note 43, at 10.
90.
THOMAS & SILLEN, supra note 67, at 101; TAKAKI,
supra
note 71, at 114.
91.
OGAWA, supra note 43, at 14-15.
92.
ROGER DANIELS & HARRY H.L. KITANO, AMERICAN RACISM:
EXPLORATION OF
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 67 (1970). See also DANIELS,
supra
note 3,
at 29; Richard A. Oehling, The Yellow Menace: Asian
Images in American
Film,
in THE KALEIDOSCOPIC LENS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VIEWS ETHNIC
GROUPS 182
(Randall M.
Miller ed., 1980).
93.
FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND
JAPANESE-AMERICANS 79
(1976).
94.
OGAWA, supra note 43, at 58.
95.
SPICKARD, supra note 69, at 35.
96.
An example of an expression of this fear appears in 1913
hearings that
were held on the alien land bills in the California
legislature:
Near my home is an eighty-acre tract of as fine land as
there is in
California. On that land lives a Japanese. With that
Japanese lives a white
woman. In that woman's arms is a baby. What is that baby? It
isn't a
Japanese. It
isn't white. I'll tell you what it is. It is the germ of the
mightiest
problem
that ever faced this state; a problem that will make the
black problem of
the
South look white.
FRANKLIN HICHBORN, THE STORY OF THE SESSION OF THE
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE
OF 1909, 1911, 1913, 1915, at 230-31 (1909-1916), cited
in YAMATO
ICHIHASHI, JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL STUDY
OF THE PROBLEMS
OF THE
JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 217 (1932). See
also DANIELS,
supra note 86, at 59; DANIELS, supra note 3,
at 15.
97.
HOSOKAWA, supra note 22, at 82. Research on the press
indicates
that it played some role in the dissemination of the
stereotype of a
"yellow
peril," though scholars disagree as to its influence. Morton
Grodzins'
exhaustive study of the California press found that, with
only two
exceptions, no
newspaper columnists of the time trusted Japanese Americans.
GRODZINS,
supra note 24. For a different interpretation of the
role of the
press,
see Gary Y. Okihiro & Julie Sly, The Press, Japanese
Americans, and
the
Concentration Camps, 44 PHYLON 66-83 (1983), who
conclude that the
decision
to relocate the Japanese was governmental and not favored by
the press or
the
public. Id. at 83.
98.
OGAWA, supra note 43, at 15.
99.
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, 1 Nov. 1920, cited in OGAWA,
supra
note 43, at 15.
100.
DANIELS, supra note 86, at 25.
101.
CAPTAIN AMERICA 8 (June 1944).
102.
It is certainly the case that the Japanese were the villains
in some
of
the comic strips with the widest circulation. For example,
most of the
villains
in Terry and the Pirates, by Milton Caniff, were
Japanese. Terry
and
the Pirates Invade New York Gallery, LIFE, 6 Jan. 1941,
at 34.
Occasionally,
a comic portrayed Japanese Americans in a positive light.
Under duress, Ham
Fischer drew a single panel in which the Joe Palooka
character
recognized
the loyalty of a Nisei in American Army uniform, but it
appeared only in
the
Seattle Times and was too little too late. HOSOKAWA,
supra
note 22,
at 250.
103.
DOWER, supra note 5, at 189.
104.
Id. at 189. See also Oehling, supra
note 92, at
199.
105.
DOWER, supra note 5, at 77-93, 182-87.
106.
GEORGE FERGUSON, SIGNS AND SYMBOLS IN CHRISTIAN ART 11
(1961).
107.
Sessue Hayakawa played the role of the villain in The
Cheat and
"emerged a rising matinee idol. American women were
fascinated by his good
looks
and pre-Valentino exotic allure." Stephen Gong, Zen
Warrior of the
Celluloid
(Silent) Years 8 BRIDGE 39 (1984). See also GINA
MARCHETTI,
ROMANCE
AND THE "YELLOW PERIL:" RACE, SEX, AND DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES
IN HOLLYWOOD
FICTION
25-27 (1993). See also EUGENE FRANKLIN WONG, ON
VISUAL MEDIA RACISM:
ASIANS IN THE AMERICAN MOTION PICTURES (1978); ALLEN L. WOLL
& RANDALL
M.
MILLER, ETHNIC AND RACIAL IMAGES IN AMERICAN FILM AND
TELEVISION:
HISTORICAL
ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1987).
108.
TEN BROECK ET AL., supra note 72, at 30.
109.
The Japanese Association of Southern California went to the
Los
Angeles
City Council to protest against the showing of the film.
When
Paramount
reissued the film in 1918, the character was Burmese and
renamed. THE
AMERICAN FILM INSTITUTE CATALOG OF MOTION PICTURES PRODUCED
IN THE UNITED
STATES
134 (Patricia Hanson ed., 1988).
110.
Id. at 30-31.
111.
DANIELS, supra note 86, at 76. OGAWA, supra
note 43, at
18.
112.
TEN BROECK ET AL., supra note 72, at 31.
113.
Irvin Paik, That Oriental Feeling, in ROOTS: AN
ASIAN-AMERICAN
READER 31 (Amy Tachiki et al. eds., 1971).
114.
TEN BROECK ET AL., supra note 72, at 30-31. See
also
Gong, supra note 107, at 39.
115.
DEEMS TAYLOR, A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE MOVIES 85 (1950).
116.
TEN BROECK ET AL., supra note 72, at 66-67. See
also
Oehling, supra note 92, at 197.
117.
Some might question whether the stereotype of the Japanese
male has
changed or has remained the same. Stereotypes change over
time and seem to
go in
cycles. OGAWA, supra note 43, at 26-39 (discusses the
evolution in
the
traits ascribed to Japanese Americans). To explain the
change from "the
inferior
Jap stereotype" to the "superior citizen" and "social
equal," Ogawa argues
that
the sexually aggressive stereotype had to be altered:
Many white Americans cannot yet accept the notion of a
Mongoloid marrying
or
having sex with a white woman. The sexual dilemma in which
these white men
find themselves seems to be resolved by the stereotype of
the "shy,
quiet
lover of gardens." In this instance, the Japanese is
elevated socially,
and to
prevent bastardization of the white race, is castrated.
Non-masculinity
permeates
the stereotype of "quiet and shy, lovers of gardens." This
type of man is
not a
threat to the white woman. Indeed, the gardener can be left
with the wife
at home
alone, while the man of the house goes to work assured that
this shy
fellow is
really uninterested in white woman.
Id. at 58.
If Ogawa's theory is correct, that might explain the "nerdy"
or "wimpy"
stereotype of Asian American men that is sometimes
mentioned. For an
analysis of
the "desexualization" of the Asian American male, see
DARRELL Y. HAMAMOTO,
MONITORED PERIL: ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE POLITICS OF TV
REPRESENTATION
8-10,
58-61 (1994). For a discussion of Dr. Fu Manchu, the epitome
of an "asexual
being," see ELAINE H. KIM, ASIAN AMERICAN LITERATURE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO
THE
WRITINGS AND THEIR SOCIAL CONTEXT 8, 178-81 (1982). See
also
Ching-Ching
Ni, Shedding Their Shifts--and a Stereotype, L.A.
TIMES 23 Feb.
1995, at
E1, E10.
Even though the Asian American male is sometimes depicted as
"sexless,"
presumably in order to render him nonthreatening, the
earlier sexually
aggressive
stereotype remains. In the 1993 film, Rising Sun, the
main
Japanese
male character is portrayed as a playboy who prefers white
women. The
Washington
representative of the Japanese American Citizens League was
quoted as
saying:
"The movie is another twist on the Japanese Invaders/Yellow
Peril genre
that has
been around Hollywood for awhile." Elaine Dutka
Asian-Americans: Rising
Furor
Over "Rising Sun," L.A. TIMES, 28 July 1993, at F9. The
portrayal of
playboy
Eddie Sakamura indicates that the same stereotype of the
sexually
aggressive
Japanese male voracious for white women persists. A 1993 NBC
movie called
Silent Cries focussed on a group of British,
American, and
Australian
women captured by the Japanese armies and subjected to the
cruelty of a
camp
commandant. See the review, Dorothy Rabinowitz, No
Whitewash for This
War
Atrocity WALL ST. J., 8 Mar. 1993, at A8. In addition
considerable
media
attention focussed on Japan's admission that its pre-1945
government had
recruited "comfort women" (from other Asian countries) to
provide sex for
soldiers. The headlines made reference to "sexual slavery."
See,
e.g.,
Jake Doherty, Conference to Focus on Plight of Wartime
"Comfort
Women"
L.A. TIMES, 20 Feb. 1993, at B3; Sam Jameson, Japan
Admits Sexual
Slavery in
WWII, Expresses Remorse, L.A. TIMES, 7 July 1992, at A1,
A14; Teresa
Watanabe, Japan Admits That WWII Sex Slaves Were
Coerced, L.A.
TIMES, 5
Aug. 1993, at A1, A6. Even though white women are not
involved and even
though
the men are Japanese as opposed to Japanese Americans, the
coverage might
still
reinforce the sexual stereotype of Japanese American men.
(The public
historically has tended not to distinguish between Japanese
and Japanese
American
males.) It is curious that the media seem to perpetuate this
imagery.
See
Stewart Kwoh & Julie Su, Individuals Lose When a
Group is
Demeaned,
L.A. TIMES 25 Apr. 1995, at B7. See also Christine
Choy, Images
of
Asian-Americans in Films and Television, in ETHNIC
IMAGES IN AMERICAN
FILM
AND TELEVISION 145-55 (Randall M. Miller ed., 1978).
118.
OGAWA, supra note 43, at 16. See also DOROTHY
SWAINE
THOMAS, THE SALVAGE 12-13 (1953).
119.
OGAWA, supra note 43. See also THOMAS,
supra note
118, at 12-13.
120.
GRODZINS, supra note 24, at 49.
121.
KITANO, supra note 51, at 31; MYER, supra note
19, at
13;
HOSOKAWA, supra note 22, at 97.
122.
Trager, supra note 12, at 12.
123.
GRODZINS, supra note 24, at 61.
124.
KITANO, supra note 51, at 38.
125.
Akemi Kikumura & Harry H. Kitano, Interracial
Marriage: A
Picture of Japanese Americans, 29 J. OF SOC. ISSUES
67-81 (1973).
126.
KITANO, supra note 51, at 40.
127.
SPICKARD, supra note 69, at 35.
128.
WILSON & HOSOKAWA, supra note 26, at 126.
129.
KITANO, supra note 51, at 33.
130.
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians Act:
Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United
States
Senate,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1982). See also HOSOKAWA,
supra
note 22,
at 97.
131.
HOSOKAWA, supra note 22, at 27.
132.
AUDREY GIRDNER & ANNE LOFTIS, THE EVACUATION OF THE
JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WWII 473 (1970); HARRY H. KITANO,
RACE RELATIONS
282
(1974); OGAWA, supra note 43, at 43.
133.
For examples of works using the psychohistorical approach,
see LLOYD
DEMAUSE, FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOHISTORY (1982); H. STUART
HUGHES, HISTORY AS
ART
AND AS SCIENCE 42-67 (1964); JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A
PSYCHOHISTORY
(1970);
PETER LOEWENBERG, DECODING THE PAST: THE PSYCHOHISTORICAL
APPROACH (1983);
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HISTORY (Bruce Mazlish ed., 1963);
MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN,
FATHERS
AND CHILDREN: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE SUBJUGATION OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN
(1975).
134.
See DEMAUSE, supra note 133.
135.
THOMAS & SILLEN, supra note 67, at 104.
136.
Id. at 106.
137.
Id.
138.
DAVID ABRAHAMSEN, OUR VIOLENT SOCIETY (1970).
139.
THOMAS & SILLEN, supra note 67, at 103.
140.
For a discussion of the concept of projection, see GORDON
ALLPORT, THE
NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1958); DUNDES, supra note 2;
SIGMUND FREUD,
THE BASIC
WRITINGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 164 (1938); SIGMUND FREUD,
COLLECTED PAPERS III
449
(1959); SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 170
(1953);
Leopold Bellak, The Concept of Projection: An
Experimental
Investigation and
Study of the Concept, 7 PSYCHIATRY 353-70 (1944);
141.
SPICKARD, supra note 69, at 39. It is interesting
that on
television Asian women are usually paired with Anglo male
news anchors.
Darrell
Y. Hamamoto refers to this as the "Connie Chung" syndrome.
He discusses the
"overrepresentation of female Asian American anchorpersons
and the
near-total
absence of their male counterparts." HAMAMOTO, supra
note 117, at
245-47.
See also K. Connie Kang, Separate, Distinct--and
Equal, L.A.
TIMES,
20 Aug. 1993, at A21.
142.
SPICKARD, supra note 69, at 39. For a study of the
impact of
sexual stereotyping on the psyche of Asian American women,
see Connie Chan,
Asian-American Women: Psychological Responses to Sexual
Exploitation and
Cultural Stereotypes, 6 WOMEN & THERAPY 33-38
(1988). This seems to
contribute to the phenomenon known as mail order brides.
See Toko
Serita,
Mail Order Sexploitation, 9 BRIDGE 39 (1984) ("a
sharp increase in
the
number of white men ordering brides through marriage
agencies").
143.
For example, Thomas and Sillen discuss this phenomenon as
follows:
White men forced black women into their beds--and cried
"Rape" when a
Black man
so much as glanced at White Womanhood on her pedestal of
chastity. White
men
fathered black children--and asserted that there was a
"natural repugnance"
between the races. Whites castrated black men--and
proclaimed that they
were thus
defending the values of Western civilization.
In no other area of human experience have the distortions of
racism been
more
bizarre.
THOMAS & SILLEN, supra note 67, at 101. See
also BELL,
supra note 70, at 68; CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL
RACISM: THE
EMOTIONAL BARRIER TO AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY 40 (1976).
144.
ALLPORT, supra note 140, at 353.
145.
Other legal policies also reflected the white fantasy about
predatory minorities. For example, nuisance laws formerly
prevented the
Japanese
from hiring white girls. KITANO, supra note 132, at
216.
146.
ALLPORT, supra note 140, at 353-54.
147.
Paul R. Spickard, Injustice Compounded: Amerasians and
Non-Japanese
Americans in World War II Concentration Camps, 5 J. AM.
ETHNIC HIST. 5
(1986). Apparently most non-Japanese husbands chose to stay
at home rather
than
join their Japanese wives in prison: "It was a rare
non-Japanese husband
who was
willing to join his wife and children behind barbed wire."
Id. at
13.
Spickard speculates that there were economic reasons for
this.
148.
Id. at 8. SPICKARD, supra note 69, at 54.
149.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
150.
IRONS, supra note 11, at 95; CHUMAN, supra
note 93, at
191.
151.
198 P.2d 17 (1948).
152.
388 U.S. 1 (1967). Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation,
Eugenics, and
Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving, 21 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 421-452
(1987).
Girdner and Loftis provide an intriguing historical detail.
The Japanese
American
Citizens legal counsel, William Muritani, the first Nisei
lawyer to
argue
before the Supreme Court, was asked to give an oral
presentation in the
Loving case in March 1967. GIRDNER & LOFTIS,
supra note
132, at
441. It is also striking that in Loving the couple
was a white man
and a
half Black, half Native-American wife.
153.
Charles McClain, Of Medicine, Race, and American Law: The
Bubonic
Plague Outbreak of 1900, 13 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
447-513 (1988).
154.
Caucasian Americans seem to have trouble distinguishing
between
Chinese
and Japanese Americans. A 1941 Life magazine noted:
"U.S. citizens
have
been demonstrating a distressing ignorance on the delicate
question of how
to
tell a Chinese from a Jap." How to Tell Japs From the
Chinese,
LIFE, 22
Dec. 1941, at 81. To help avoid further confusion,
Life printed "a
rule-of-thumb from the anthropometric conformations that
distinguish
friendly
Chinese from enemy alien Japs." Milton Caniff also drew
sketches to make
this
point which were originally published in military manuals.
Speaking of
Pictures . . . the Army Gets to Know a Lady Named Lace,
LIFE, 1 Mar.
1943, at
12.
Nevertheless, as Weglyn explains: "[t]he public became
totally confused in
their
hatred . . . Chinese Americans and other Asians began
wearing 'I am a
Chinese'
buttons in fear of being assaulted and spat upon." WEGLYN,
supra
note 3,
at 36.
155.
Mark Barnes, AIDS and Mr. Korematsu: Minorities at Times
of
Crisis, 7 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 35-43 (1988).
156.
Alan C. Miller & Ronald J. Ostrow, Some Fear Civil
Liberties
May
Be Added to Conflict's Toll, L.A. TIMES, 14 Feb. 1991,
at A9.
157.
Joanne Hirase expresses this same sentiment. Hirase,
supra note
32, at 183. See also Sandra Takahata, The Case of
Korematsu v.
United
States: Could it be Justified Today?, 6 U. HAW. L. REV.
109-75
(1984).
158.
Okazaki, supra note
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