The Asian Spectrum

Muthiah Alagappa

Democracy's Future

Early in the post-World War II era, a majority of countries in East and Southeast Asia had democratic political systems. Over time, however, many of these were supplanted by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. By the early 1970s, only Japan retained a fully democratic system, with Malaysia and Singapore belonging to the category of semidemocracy. The February 1986 "people power" revolution in the Philippines, however, marked the beginning of a return of democracy to the region. Democratic transitions followed in South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Thailand, as well as in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan. These have been interpreted by some Western policy makers and analysts as part of a growing trend toward democratic governance not only in Asia but in the world at large.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, the two variables likely to have the greatest effect on prospects for the spread of democracy are economic development and political leadership. ¹ Economically, the countries of East and Southeast Asia are among the most dynamic in the world. Many of them have experienced high-single-digit or double-digit annual growth rates for well over a decade. Even the laggard economies of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Burma are beginning to turn around. Governing elites in nearly all of these countries are committed to economic development and modernization. Provided this rapid economic growth benefits all sectors of society, it should be a positive factor for democratic development in the region.

In a number of countries, however--namely, China, Vietnam, Burma, [End Page 29] Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and Laos--the same elites who support economic development reject democracy. In part their rejection of the democratic ideal is a response to the perceived "reactionary imperialism" of the West. In part it is aimed at preserving their own power. Yet it also stems from a conviction that liberal democracy is not well suited to Asian cultures and that it will hinder modernization. Even elites in these countries who are supportive of democracy believe that it must be tailored to reflect national values.

Declining political legitimacy, which Huntington identified as one of the changes that precipitated the "third wave" democratic transitions, is in my view a third key variable influencing regime change. ² Prospects for democratic development in East and Southeast Asia hinge on the interaction of this factor with the two others described above.

The Challenge of Consolidation

The challenge now facing South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand is consolidation of their democratic gains. In Taiwan and South Korea, democratic principles are already firmly entrenched and the conditions that foster broad and meaningful political participation are gaining ground. Yet both countries still face significant political and economic problems that will make further democratic development slow and contentious.

Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan has traveled rapidly along the democratic path. The 1947 Constitution has been amended in several important respects, free elections have taken place, the Kuomintang (KMT) party and the government are gradually separating from each other, and a competitive party system is emerging. President Lee Teng-hui is committed to further democratization. Contrary to concerns expressed by some Asian leaders that democratic development would impede economic growth, Taiwan's economy has grown by 6 to 8 percent annually since 1987. Moreover, the Taiwanese public strongly supports democratic reform. All of these factors make it unlikely that democratization will undergo a reversal in Taiwan.

Still, a number of complicating factors are likely to slow its progress. Taiwan's future political status gives special cause for concern. There is growing popular dissatisfaction with Taiwan's international isolation, and an increasingly vocal movement for political independence. A democratically elected government might feel compelled to move further in this direction, aggravating tension with the People's Republic of China. In this scenario, the increased salience of security considerations would lead to a greater allocation of resources to defense, possibly triggering a renewed political role for the military.

South Korea, too, has undergone significant democratic development since 1987. Elections have been held at the national and provincial [End Page 30] levels, with local elections scheduled for 1995. The 1992 election of the first civilian president, Kim Young Sam, has been interpreted by some observers as marking the definitive end of military rule. As in Taiwan, the forces that fueled the democratic transition are still salient. Industrialization appears likely to continue, the polity has become more complex and differentiated, and civil society has gained strength. Many segments of the population are voicing demands for further economic and political reform.

Yet a number of problems are hindering democratization. Power continues to be concentrated in the executive, money politics and corruption continue to dominate the political process, institutionalization of political parties is yet to be accomplished, and the rule of law has been slow to develop. Serious economic conflicts have emerged, many of them revolving around the equitable distribution of wealth. Moreover, the government is having difficulty managing the transition from a labor-intensive economy to one based on high technology. The changing relationship with North Korea, with its uncertain consequences for democratization, constitutes yet another formidable challenge.

In Thailand and the Philippines, democratic development is less firmly rooted. In Thailand, democratic values have gradually gained ground since 1932, despite periodic reversals. The military leadership's attempt to consolidate its position through the March 1992 elections led to violent political conflict between the military and the new social forces. A democratic government acceded to power in the wake of the September 1992 elections.

Democracy, however, is far from established in Thailand. Political parties are still regional and weak--and sufficiently numerous that the need for coalition governments, vulnerable to crisis and collapse, will likely continue. Owing to rampant vote buying in rural areas, the victors in elections cannot claim to represent the popular will. Moreover, the Thai military remains a formidable political force with which any elected government must contend. So long as the military does not fully accept the principle of civilian control, the democratic system in Thailand will not be the sole repository of power. Finally, many Thais are not fully committed to the democratic ideal. Thus, while over the long term democratic values and procedures will probably continue to gain ground, other factors may be used as a temporary basis of political legitimacy.

In the Philippines, little substantive progress has been made since the restoration of formal democracy in 1986. Although the power and influence of the military and the radical Left have declined, along with the threat these elements pose to a democratic system, the necessary preconditions for broad and meaningful political participation--equality among citizens in access to resources and opportunities, as well as in rights and obligations--appear unlikely to obtain for some time to come. The vast majority of Filipinos continue to live in abject poverty, and [End Page 31] there is little prospect for significant improvement in social conditions in the foreseeable future. Most governing elites belong to old political clans, and in recent years there has been a return to pork-barrel and patronage politics. Political parties remain weak; the legal system is inaccessible to most citizens, inefficient, and weakened by widespread bribery and corruption; and violations of civil rights are common.

All this suggests that democracy in the Philippines remains vulnerable to manipulation by a strongman or displacement through a military coup. Given the still fresh memory of abuses during the Marcos era, complete reversal of democracy is unlikely in the immediate future. Nevertheless, moving beyond formal democracy in the Philippines is contingent upon substantial socioeconomic development.

The Weakness of Autocracy

The tide of democracy has so far left many countries in East and Southeast Asia untouched. China, Vietnam, Burma, and Indonesia are among the key countries whose political elites have challenged the universality of the democratic ideal. Yet notwithstanding the negative attitude toward democracy displayed by their current leaders, political liberalization and possibly even a more competitive political system cannot be ruled out in the medium to long term. Two interrelated developments currently give grounds for hope: the declining legitimacy of the present regimes, and the leaders' commitment to economic growth and modernization as a means of recapturing that legitimacy.

The limited political liberalization and economic reform initiated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1979 brought substantial benefits for nearly all segments of the Chinese population and shored up the party's legitimacy. But it also eroded the cohesion of the government and undermined the credibility of the Marxist-Leninist system, giving rise to the June 1989 Tiananmen incident. The government's deployment of massive force to suppress the demonstrations reflected its own weakness and further undermined regime legitimacy among the urban population, particularly in Beijing.

Since 1989, China's political leaders have staked their claim to rule even more firmly on strong economic performance. Under these circumstances, any economic downturn may undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Yet the imperative to maintain high growth rates has made controlling inflation difficult, leading to widespread disenchantment, particularly among those already disadvantaged by the current phase of reform. Moreover, rapid economic growth has been accompanied by the development of professional associations and other civil society groups, who may begin to voice demands for political participation. In any case, the CCP leaders themselves realize that economic performance alone cannot serve as a basis of political legitimacy over the medium to long [End Page 32] term. Recognizing the current weakness of their ideological credentials, they have sought to tap into nationalism, which has been on the rise in China. Confucianism may also enjoy a revitalization as the leadership seeks a new basis of moral authority. East Asia's successful dominant-party political systems, such as those in Singapore and pre-1987 South Korea and Taiwan, have also attracted the attention of some Chinese leaders and scholars.

Politics in Vietnam has followed a similar course. After reunification in 1975, the socialist policies of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) contributed to an economic crisis in the South. Moreover, poor economic performance in the North, which had been tolerated during the war, led to widespread disenchantment with the regime. Coupled with infighting and corruption within the VCP, these developments undermined the party's legitimacy. To recapture legitimacy, in 1986 the VCP adopted as its goal doi moi, or political and economic renovation. This policy has elicited a mixed response. Critics have challenged some crucial aspects of political renovation, while the benefits of improved economic performance have not been shared equally. As in China, while economic reform may shore up the legitimacy of the incumbent leadership, it could also lay the groundwork for challenges to the legitimacy of the system at a more fundamental level. Recognizing this, VCP leaders have tentatively begun to explore alternative models of governance.

In Burma, accumulated resentment against the military-socialist regime of General Ne Win--which, though it never had much legitimacy to begin with, had managed to survive for well over two decades--burst into a countrywide "people power" uprising in 1989. In an effort to silence domestic opposition and gain international legitimacy, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) scheduled national elections for May 1990. Despite results that clearly indicated a desire for change, the military has refused to hand over the reigns of power. The SLORC, which is seen as a continuation of the previous military-socialist regime, continues to suffer a fundamental legitimacy crisis, and controls Burma by means of coercion. In an attempt to establish a stronger basis of authority it has begun to liberalize the economy, and it is seeking to provide a formal political role for the military, perhaps along the lines of the Indonesian dwifungsi or "dual function" model.

Of the nondemocratic regimes discussed here, the Suharto government in Indonesia currently enjoys the highest degree of legitimacy. It initially staked its claim to rule on the promise of political stability and economic development, which had great appeal to the Indonesian populace in light of the country's continual political upheaval from 1950 to 1965, as well as the sharp deterioration in living standards, especially during the "guided democracy" era (1957-65). In the mid-1980s, however, with political stability assured and Suharto's personal authority subject to increasing criticism, the legitimacy of the regime began to [End Page 33] decline. The key principles and goals of the New Order have been challenged by associations of intellectuals, human rights organizations, Islamic organizations, Christian minorities, and some segments of the armed forces. As a result, the government has relied increasingly on economic development as a basis of legitimacy. The country's economic performance since 1965 has been impressive, and by most accounts the benefits of growth have extended to all social classes.

Suharto and his government are still being criticized by those who insist that economic growth has increased inequity and, moreover, that economic performance and stability are not an adequate underpinning of political legitimacy. The demand for democratic government is not yet widespread, however, and the challenges are not likely to spark a political crisis in the near future. On the other hand, the principles and goals undergirding the legitimacy of the present regime will not be enough to support long-term harmony between ruler and ruled. Future governments will have to find a new formula to legitimate themselves.

Alternative Models

Recognition of their declining legitimacy has led political elites in all of the nondemocratic countries of East and Southeast Asia, however grudgingly, to explore alternative models of governance. Given the political, cultural, and socioeconomic context of the region, three such models seem plausible: Islamic theocracy, authoritarian pluralism, and dominant-party democracy. Islam can be considered a competing political ideology only in Indonesia and Malaysia, and even there its appeal is limited to a minority of the Muslim population. In Indonesia, the powerful military opposes the idea of a theocratic state. In Malaysia, the government has sought to coopt Islam by infusing Islamic values into the administration, thereby keeping radical Islam in check.

The authoritarian-pluralist and dominant-party democracy models, though quite distinct, can be viewed as separate stages on a continuum between authoritarianism and democracy. In the authoritarian-pluralist model, the party or other governing group retains a monopoly on political power but is willing to grant a measure of political and cultural freedom at the individual, group, and regional levels. Moreover, some development of civil society is tolerated, particularly in the professional arena. Economic development is governed by market principles. The model holds special appeal for China and Vietnam because it would seem to allow for continued monopolization of political power by the party leadership while facilitating the desired outcomes of social stability and economic growth. Yet, as demonstrated by the experiences of Thailand from 1957 to 1973 and, later, by those of South Korea and Taiwan, the authoritarian-pluralist model contains the seeds of its own destruction. The social changes brought about by economic growth [End Page 34] inevitably give rise to political demands that challenge the monopolization of political power by one party or group. Thus the authoritarian-pluralist model is by its very nature a transitional one.

The dominant-party democracy model is an abstraction of the experience of Japan and, to a lesser degree, Malaysia and Singapore. Its chief features are free elections, protection of civil liberties, a dominant party that stays in power over a long period, an interventionist state, a strong central bureaucracy, and management of the political affairs of the country by means of conciliation and consensus-building. Because it is based on the cultural heritage and traditions of East Asia (such as respect for strong authority and emphasis on community interests over individual rights), some see this as a distinct and durable Asian form of democracy. South Korea and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan have sought to emulate the Japanese political system. Owing to abuses of power by the long-reigning Liberal Democratic Party, however, the dominant-party democracy model is currently being challenged in Japan itself. Its future in the region is unclear. In any case, this is presently not an attractive model for China and Vietnam.

In the nondemocratic countries of East and Southeast Asia, sustained economic development, which the governing elite perceive as the mainstay of their legitimacy, will continue to fuel demands for political liberalization and ultimately system transformation. What these changes will be, whether they will be revolutionary or evolutionary, and when they will occur are difficult to predict. It is hard to envisage democratic transitions occurring in the near term in China and Vietnam, where independent political organization has been--and will likely continue to be--hampered by the intolerance of incumbent governments. A new Tiananmen incident would, at best, speed the pace of political change. At worst, it could result in a strengthening of conservative forces and a corresponding diminution of the likelihood of democratic transition.

A more likely scenario is continued gradual political liberalization initiated and controlled by the CCP and the VCP, respectively. In China, significant political change will have to await the demise of patriarch Deng Xiaoping, and its pace will depend on the cohesion, power, and orientation of the new leadership. An important question in both China and Vietnam is whether the "supply" of liberalization will keep pace with demand. If it does, these countries may be able to follow the authoritarian-pluralist model for several decades. If it does not, the process of political change will be marked by tension and conflict.

Prospects for a democratic transition are a bit brighter in Burma and Indonesia. Both countries have previous experience with democracy, and both have political parties in place. The main stumbling block in both cases is the military's refusal to relinquish power. Because the military is a key political force in both countries, any political system that does not take it into account will not be sustainable. One possible scenario [End Page 35] is a gradual transition to democracy through power sharing between elected representatives and the military establishment. Yet gradualism requires a strong leader who is also committed to liberalization and eventual democratization. In Indonesia, Suharto has the requisite authority but has not shown signs of moving toward democratization, and he may have missed the opportunity to do so. The Burmese military, though physically in control, is morally bankrupt and fighting for survival, and thus unlikely to take the initiative in democratization. Although history is not always a reliable guide, in the past, political-system transformations in Indonesia and Burma (as well as China and Vietnam) have been abrupt and violent.

While it can be useful to conceptualize political change in terms of broad waves or global trends, each country follows a unique trajectory. System change will be driven mostly by domestic factors--regime legitimacy, elite cohesion, the level and pace of socioeconomic development, the political orientation of the military, income distribution, civil society, and so forth. These conditions must be propitious if international forces are to have a significant impact. In the case of East and Southeast Asia, the current international environment cannot be judged to be prodemocratic. While the United States and other Western nations have made the promotion of democracy an important element of their foreign policies, no Asian government has done so. Even Japan, while remaining firmly committed to democratic government for itself, has shown little enthusiasm for spreading democracy abroad. Moreover, the political influence of the West has declined, and is likely to decline even further if the East and Southeast Asian countries continue to experience rapid economic growth. On the other hand, intraregional influences are likely to be strong. System change in China, for example, is likely to have an impact on Vietnam and North Korea, and developments in Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand will affect one another.

Finally, it is important to remember that Western-style democracy is only one yardstick of political development. If we view Asian countries only through a democratic lens, we run the risk of undervaluing political changes that are quite significant from the perspective of the governed. For example, China today is far from democratic in the Western sense; nevertheless, the China of Deng is vastly different from the China of Mao. Substantial political change has in fact occurred throughout the region over the last decade and a half, though it is often overlooked by observers who focus exclusively on democracy. The democratic paradigm is certainly relevant to Asia, but it is not the whole story.

Muthiah Alagappa, a native of Malaysia, is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. Previously a visiting professor in the East Asian Institute and the political science department at Columbia University and a senior fellow at the Institute for Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia, he is the editor of Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia (forthcoming).

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 315-16.

2. Ibid., 45-58.

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