Governance That Works

Bilahari Kausikan

Hong Kong, Singapore, and "Asian Values"

In a short book published more than 30 years ago, C.B. Macpherson, an authority on the history and theory of democracy, argued that the real world of democracy had changed and would continue to change. Moreover, he argued, Western liberal democracy was only one historical variant of democracy. ¹ It is unfortunate that this sensible approach is apparently no longer fashionable. If it were taken by more people today, much futile debate might be avoided. It seems self-evident that there are many varieties of democracy. The world is a vast and diverse place, and what will work in one country will not necessarily be appropriate for another. Every country is characterized by a unique set of circumstances, with natural, human, and cultural resources and historical experiences that differentiate it from all other nations. Therefore, every country must find its own specific solutions to the problems of governance. The concept of democracy is surely robust and flexible enough to survive this diversity.

Nevertheless, debates over the appropriateness of one democratic model or another in Asia and elsewhere (and, more generally, over whether or not there is such a thing as "universal" human rights) are now commonplace. ² The current debate began among various governments in the early 1990s--when the end of the Cold War seemed to open up boundless possibilities--as part of preparations for the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in June 1993. These were perhaps not the most propitious of circumstances for [End Page 24] a balanced or nuanced examination of the issues. At any rate, such debate is increasingly of greater concern to the academy and to the scribbling and chattering classes--that is, to pundits, journalists, and miscellaneous commentators--than to governments themselves.

For most governments, the enthusiasms that marked the immediate post-Cold War period have faded, giving way to a more sober outlook. Events not only in Asia but also in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union seem to have demonstrated that reality is too complex and intractable to be forced into a simple or single pattern. Of course, the rhetoric persists, and these matters will certainly remain on intergovernmental agendas, assuming lesser or greater prominence as circumstances change. Democracy and human rights are undoubtedly very important matters. But they are also becoming much too constricting filters for the ever more complex and multidimensional nature of interstate relations. Governments are again dealing with one another the way they always have--pragmatically. This is a healthy development. It does not mean that any country or group of countries is required to give up its most cherished values. It merely means that it is now widely recognized that we need not all have the same beliefs in order to cooperate effectively or be friends. Indeed, such homogeneity is not even desirable.

The differences among countries are not really all that acute. Their extent has been exaggerated owing to the common failure to make a critical distinction between democracy as a political theory of legitimation of government and democracy as a mechanism or instrument of government. There is, of course, some overlap between the two meanings of the term. But they are not the same thing. Democracy in the first sense is now almost universal. Today, few governments seek to justify their rule by reference to divine right, the will of the proletariat, lineage, or some other nondemocratic principle. Democracy in the second sense is naturally a very flexible concept, because it must adapt to specific sets of circumstances and evolve as those circumstances change. Its shape cannot be determined by a process of a priori reasoning from a set of values or principles. Not everyone is comfortable with this.

It is easy to see, then, why debate over these issues is becoming more relevant to the academy than to interstate relations. It is Adam Smith who is credited with the wry observation that "the learned give up the evidence of their senses to preserve the coherence of the ideas of their imagination." ³ As the arena of debate over Asian democracy shifts away from those with practical responsibilities for governance, its tone is becoming more ideological, even theological. The arguments lack balance and a sense of proportion. Many of the participants view matters in black-and-white terms: A country is democratic in one's own image or else it is an intolerable dictatorship; rights are absolute or else they [End Page 25] are nonexistent. Some people involved in the debate appear to be responding more to their own hopes and fears than to anything grounded in fact.

A False Dichotomy

The 11 February 1996 edition of the Washington Post contained two contrasting articles on Singapore. In the first, Nathan Gardels (editor of New Perspectives Quarterly) praised Singapore as the "city of the future" and asked "what America can learn from postliberal Singapore." In the second, Stephen Wrage (a professor at Johns Hopkins University) dismissed Singapore as "Big Brother's hometown" and "a dressed-up dictatorship." It is certainly not unpleasant to be held up for emulation. And it is not difficult to show that Wrage's analysis is marred by many factual errors. But the real significance of this pair of articles by representatives of the "scribbling class" is that both were only peripherally about Singapore. The many elementary mistakes that riddled Wrage's article indicated that he was more interested in elaborating the "ideas of his imagination" than accurately describing a real geographic place. ⁴ As for the article by Gardels, his description of Singapore as "postliberal" was somewhat misleading. How can Singapore be postliberal when it has never pretended or aspired to be liberal? In both articles, Singapore as a specific place or society serves merely as a convenient device for the authors to use in describing their own visions of heaven and hell.

Singapore, of course, is neither a terrestrial paradise nor a hell on earth. Indeed, paradise and hell, however camouflaged, have no place in discussions of any political system; they are questions of the afterlife and therefore of no relevance to analysis of the real world of democ- racy in Asia or anywhere else. Such analysis must deal with the empirical rather than the ideological, with hard facts rather than subjec- tive hopes or fears. The cast of mind illustrated by the two articles is typical and colors many discussions on Asian democracy to some degree.

Because Singapore's leaders believe in airing serious questions through genuine public discussion (rather than sound bites), and because they have been articulate and forceful in expressing their views on the appropriate organization of Singaporean society, a minor academic industry seems to have sprung up devoted to the discussion and dissection of the so-called Singapore model. ⁵ The reality is that Singapore does not hold itself up as a model for anyone. Many discussions of the so-called Singapore model are based on a fundamental misreading of the essential message that Singapore's leaders have been trying to convey in their writings, speeches, and interviews on this issue. The very term "model" implies a universalist claim that we do not [End Page 26] make. What we have argued consistently is that diversity is an empirical fact--countries have different histories, cultures, values, and problems--and thus each nation must find its own best social and political arrangements by means of a pragmatic and continuous process of experimentation. Singapore's approach, in short, is the exact opposite of that implied by the term "model," with its universalist connotations. In our view, there cannot be a "Singapore model" that is applicable anywhere but in Singapore. ⁶

It often seems that misunderstanding or misinterpretation of Singapore's position is almost willful. It is possible that critics of the so-called Singapore school ascribe to us the universalist (and intolerant) cast of mind that they themselves unconsciously harbor. Since Singaporean leaders are apparently more often discussed than read, it may be useful to describe what they have actually said before correcting the misinterpretations. The most recent and authoritative statements on Singapore's position on democracy were made by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in his National Day speech in Singapore on 20 August 1995 and in his 16 September 1995 address entitled "The Role of Government in the East Asian Miracle" at the Center for Development Economics at Williams College in Massachusetts. ⁷

In his Williams College speech, Prime Minister Goh argued that economic development requires political stability, which in turn depends on "good government." He then described his notion of good government as government built on three pillars: democratic accountability, a long-term orientation, and social justice. To achieve long-term stability, he said, governments have to govern with the consent of the governed as conveyed through the ballot box. In this respect, Singapore is no different from Western societies. What differentiates Singapore from its Western counterparts is its long-term orientation. Goh noted that in the United States, for instance, the government's role is strictly that of representative: the government is supposed to respond to the expressed preferences of the people. This type of democratic government, he pointed out, is vulnerable to economic populism, as illustrated by the budget-deficit problems of the United States. Most developing countries, especially small ones like Singapore, he said, can ill afford such policies. Prime Minister Goh concluded:

This is why, in Singapore, government acts more like a trustee. As a custodian of the people's welfare, it exercises independent judgment on what is in the long-term economic interests of the people and acts on that basis. Government policy is not dictated by opinion polls or referenda. This has sometimes meant overriding populist pressures for "easier" economic policies. Indeed, implementing the right policies has on occasion meant administering bitter medicine to overcome economic challenges.

The trustee model of democracy that Singapore has subscribed to enabled it to pursue the tough policies necessary for economic development. [End Page 27] Indeed, the concept of government as trustee went hand in hand with democratic accountability. Because the government has acted as an honest and competent trustee of the people, we have been returned to power in every general election since self-government in 1959. With a comfortable majority and a strong mandate, we have been able to take a long-term view in addressing our economic problems. ⁸

In his National Day speech, Prime Minister Goh described Singapore's political system as a "pragmatic democracy" based on an ongoing adaptation of the good features of systems that are working well in other countries. The appropriate test of Singapore's democracy, he said, is whether it works for Singapore and serves the interests of Singaporeans. Goh made clear that Singapore is not wedded to any particular model of democracy. Referring to other Asian countries that follow Western models, he stated that if in ten years they have become better societies than Singapore, "we will hurry to catch up."

A Flawed Argument

Critics of the so-called Singapore school generally make two main arguments. The first is that Singapore has an antiquated notion of government that is destined to be swept into the dustbin of history by the wave of democratization now sweeping Asia and the world. This is sometimes given a somewhat more objective gloss through claims that economic prosperity and the rise of a middle class will force Western-style liberal democracy on even the most recalcitrant nations. Such arguments are flawed, for they fail to distinguish between democracy as a theory of political legitimation and democracy as an instrument of government, usually blithely assumed to be synonymous with Western-style liberal democracy. Almost no one challenges democracy as a theory of political legitimation. Since the end of the Cold War, even the few surviving communist-type people's democracies have changed almost beyond recognition. But it is not self-evident that a wave of democratization in the second sense of the term is sweeping the world or Asia or, even if it is, whether it will continue to advance.

Of course, as societies become more developed economically, they inevitably become more complex. New interest groups emerge on the scene and clamor to be heard. Established relationships are reordered. Stability requires that political arrangements somehow continually accommodate such new developments. But this is simply to make the trite observation that "things change." Whether change necessarily or inevitably leads to any particular political system is an altogether different matter. In fact, nothing is inevitable. The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the transitions from military and other unrepresentative governments to more [End Page 28] pluralist systems in a number of countries in Asia and around the world do not necessitate a particular style of democratization in the second sense of the term.

Apart from the case of Japan, these transitions are relatively recent phenomena in Asia. The oldest date back only about a decade, and most occurred much more recently. ⁹ More often than not, descriptions and analyses of these transitions conveniently downplay their more unsavory aspects. Yet these are the very features of the new political systems in Asia and elsewhere that may ultimately undermine support for democ- racy in the first sense of the term. Already, signs are emerging that the complex politics of rapid growth has made it more difficult for some newly pluralist Asian governments to deal with such negative effects of that growth as the degradation of the environment, severe urban congestion, and inadequate basic infrastructure. Some of the less attractive aspects of multiparty politics, like corruption and vote-buying, may ultimately provoke a backlash that could delegitimize and destabilize some governments, particularly if they also erode these governments' ability to deal with real and increasingly urgent problems. More than in established and homogeneous societies, the legitimacy, stability, and social cohesion of many newly pluralist political systems are based on their ability to generate consistently high levels of material well-being.

The difference between new democracies and established democracies, however, is one of degree rather than of kind. The "acid test" of all governments everywhere in the real world is not adherence to any particular political theory or ideal but whether they can govern effectively, fairly, and in a way that increases the general welfare. The communist versions of democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe failed not because they lacked lofty ideals, but because in the final analysis they could not deliver the goods. Any political system will fail if it is, or is perceived to be, dysfunctional. No political system or ideal is sacrosanct. Even if everyone believes that democracy in both senses of the term and in any of its variants is better than any other political theory or system, this is not enough. Democracy, in whatever form, must be made to work. It cannot be proved by abstract or a priori reasoning that Western-style democracy in its current liberal form is the "end of history." There is still a lot more history to be played out everywhere.

If the experience of the mature economies in Europe and North America is any guide, the complex interest-group politics engendered by economic growth may eventually make it more difficult to achieve the kind of flexibility essential to sustaining growth under conditions of increasing interdependence and integration with a global economy. ¹⁰ The recent experience of several Western-style democracies, especially (though not exclusively) in Europe, has clearly demonstrated that the [End Page 29] consequences of growth, if politically mismanaged, may well make growth self-limiting. The political implications for Europe and North America are still unfolding. The consequences of slow or negative growth and high unemployment for the less integrated societies in Asia and Eastern Europe could be more severe.

Cultural Differences

The second main argument made by critics of the so-called Singapore school consists of attacking the premise that, since cultures and values differ from one society to another, the specific forms of political and social organization appropriate to these societies should also differ. In its more learned manifestations, this argument involves attempts to recover from ancient Asian texts references that purport to prove that traditional Asian cultures professed democratic, or at least quasi-democratic, values. The charm of these erudite games is that they can be played endlessly without uncovering anything with practical relevance to current concerns. Most Asian societies have such long histories and rich cultures that it is possible to "prove" nearly anything about them if the context of the recovered references is ignored. In a variant of this second argument, critics point to one group or another in Asia as not professing values that others hold to be "Asian," or draw attention to the cross-cultural fertilization between Asia and the West and among different Asian countries that has undoubtedly occurred and is still in progress. ¹¹

All this misses the point. There is no doubt that every culture evolves over time and that no traditional culture, Western or Asian, exists any longer in a "pure" form. A variety of views and beliefs are present in every society. The real question is whether--notwithstanding this change and diversity--different kinds of societies exhibit general differences in the realm of values. That cultural differences exist seems irrefutable, unless one would deny the evidence of our senses. Whether there are also consequent differences in values is an empirical question that can be, and has been, tested.

David Hitchcock, a former official of the United States Information Agency, recently conducted an interesting and revealing study on the extent to which Asian and American values differ. Hitchcock found a surprisingly high degree of congruence between the values (both personal and societal) of Northeast Asians and Southeast Asians. He also discovered both similarities and differences between Americans and Asians on both levels of values. Both Asians and Americans listed self-reliance and hard work as among their most important personal values. But Asians also emphasized the importance of respect for learning, honesty, and self-discipline, whereas Americans stressed personal achievement and helping others. With respect to societal values, [End Page 30] Asians and Americans agreed on the importance of the accountability of public officials and freedom of expression. On the other hand, vastly more Asians than Americans favored an orderly society, and far more Americans than Asians emphasized personal freedom and individual rights. ¹²

The general conclusion that there are some general differences between Asian and Western societies in the realm of values seems clear enough. It therefore should not be surprising that Asian and Western societies have different conceptions of democracy. Of course, different surveys would no doubt yield different results. It is not likely that any survey would show that all Asians have exactly the same values. Nor would any survey show that all Westerners have exactly the same values. The results of any survey can be questioned on such grounds. But quibbles over the degree and nature of differences miss the point of what has been labeled the "Asian values" debate.

The issue of "Asian values" and their relation to "Western values" is not new. In one form or another it has engaged intellectuals and governments in Asia for almost two centuries, ever since their first contacts with the West. The debate has served different purposes at different times. In its current form, the key issue is not the difference between "Asian" and "Western" values, let alone the superiority or inferiority of any one set of values to another. It is not even what is distinctively or characteristically Asian about any particular set of values. Today's "Asian values" debate is basically about Asian societies' future direction and development. These societies have achieved a certain measure of economic success; the question now being asked in many of them, including Singapore, is how to sustain development over the long term, bearing in mind the pitfalls and dead ends that have confronted many more developed (mainly Western) societies.

Many Asian societies are now searching for their own distinctive configurations of market, state, and society. In debating "Asian values," they are examining such issues as the responsibilities of individuals to the society as a whole, the role of the family, the integrity of public institutions, and the maintenance of law and order--issues that are also being widely debated in the West. Many Westerners now feel that serious problems have arisen in their own countries as a result of an overemphasis on liberal values and individual rights--indeed, an erosion of the very concept of legitimate authority. In fact, the most trenchant criticisms of extreme individualism, of liberal democracy, and of key elements of Western-style systems, including education, the administration of justice, and the media, have been voiced not by Singaporeans or by citizens of any other Asian country, but by Westerners themselves. A small library could be compiled of such critiques by Western authors. ¹³ Whatever the debate over "Asian values" may be, then, it is not a clash of civilizations. [End Page 31]

The real debate is not about the values of any particular geographic area, but about values per se: it is about which values, in what degree and in what proportion, are necessary for sustained development, the maintenance of social cohesion, and the avoidance of serious problems. This is now a matter of grave concern to many Westerners as well as to Asians. But some Western liberals are uncomfortable talking about or even acknowledging values other than their own. Their defensiveness in the face of trends in their own societies may account for the vehemence with which some liberals have approached the "Asian values" debate. Their discomfort is perhaps heightened by the suspicion--still dim but growing--that the debate is not one that will end in any satisfyingly clear-cut way, let alone in victory or vindication for their own beliefs.

In fact, in the real world, the values debate is not appropriately conceived in terms of "victory" and "defeat." The real choices are always those involving the appropriate balance among different values, rights, duties, and freedoms. The real choice is not between pure individualism and pure communitarism; the alternative to complete freedom of expression is not blanket censorship; the options are not total liberty and utter repression. The appropriate balance between different sets of values--between individual rights that guarantee personal freedom, and social duties that stem from society's needs for stability and discipline--depends on the particular circumstances of each society. The balance in each country will therefore shift over time, and not only in one direction. Thus the debate over values is necessarily open-ended. No society anywhere in the real world will ever find a fixed point of perpetual and perfect equilibrium. Any society that harbors illusions of having reached such a state of nirvana, liberal or otherwise, is in for an unpleasant surprise.

Embracing Change

In any nation, the values that endure are those that pass the harsh test of experience--that is, those that work for that society. The particular mix of values that works best will necessarily change over time. A senior civil servant has expressed Singapore's fundamental philosophy as one that embraces "change as [a] superior and necessary way of life, an instrument for improvement and advancement." ¹⁴ The need for change is perhaps especially evident to a small country with no natural resources like Singapore--a country that cannot afford many illusions. Economic pain is now making even the richest and largest of countries understand that in a global economy they too must continuously adapt if they are to continue to prosper. The constraints on their ability to do so are not the result of a lack of understanding, but are mainly political and psychological. Adaptation is a constant imperative, but adaptation conceived in a teleological sense is not true adaptation. [End Page 32] This simple fact is one that many "secular theologians" of liberal democracy with no practical responsibilities for governance still find hard to grasp, or at least to admit in public.

Bilahari Kausikan is Singapore's permanent representative to the United Nations in New York. He was formerly ambassador to the Russian Federation and to Finland, and has served as both director for Southeast Asia and director for East Asia and the Pacific at Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views that are expressed in this article are his own and not those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore.

Notes

1. C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

2. On the latter question, which is closely related to the issue explored in this article, see Bilahari Kausikan, "An East Asian Approach to Human Rights," Buffalo Journal of International Law 2 (Winter 1995-96): 263-83.

3. As cited in Chalmers Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 70.

4. See S.R. Nathan (the Singaporean ambassador to the United States), "Singapore Replies to `Big Brother,'" Washington Post, 9 March 1996, A19.

5. See, for example, Eric Jones, "Asia's Fate: A Response to the Singapore School," The National Interest 35 (Spring 1994): 18-28; and Donald K. Emmerson, "Singapore and the `Asian Values' Debate," Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 95-105.

6. See my rejoinder to Jones, "Asia's Fate," in The National Interest 36 (Summer 1994): 107-8.

7. See also Goh Chok Tong, "The Singapore Press: Part of the Virtuous Cycle of Good Government and Good Society" (speech delivered at the Straits Times 150th Anniversary Dinner, Singapore, 15 July 1995).

8. In his discussion of the third element of good government, social justice, Prime Minister Goh stressed the need to treat all groups fairly if a country is to achieve and maintain social cohesion. He identified such social cohesion as one of the key factors in Singapore's economic success and the government's ability to maintain the support of the people. This emphasis on social stability and popular consent contradicts the simplistic argument--often attributed to Asian leaders in a misrepresentation of their views--that authoritarianism is a prerequisite for economic growth, which some have argued is only a cloak for repression. In fact, Singapore has never made this claim. Singapore's leaders have stressed the need for stability, but stability does not necessarily entail repression. See Kausikan, "An East Asian Approach to Human Rights," for a discussion of Singapore's approach to the relationship between democracy and development. See also Jose Edgardo Campos and Hilton Root, The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), in which the authors state that all economically successful East Asian states co-opted various segments of their populations to create an environment that was conducive to sustained growth.

9. Asian transitions are not exceptional in this regard: Western liberal democracy in its current form--encompassing universal suffrage, full civil liberties for minorities, unbridled freedom of expression, and the proliferation of "rights" of all kinds--is a historically recent phenomenon, at best still less than a century old, with most civil liberties as currently defined granted only three or four decades ago.

10. For a theoretical discussion of this point, see Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

11. A third criticism of the "Singapore school" that is often attached to the two main arguments described here is that statements of Singaporean leaders like those I have quoted here are motivated mainly by self-interest. It has never been clear to me why it should be somehow reprehensible for political leaders to articulate--and attempt to persuade others to support--their own vision of the type of government needed to deal with their society's problems. After all, all democratic politicians seek to win elections, thereby gaining the legitimacy, mandate, and power to implement their visions of government. This necessarily involves articulating their views and persuading others to support them. It is true that the vision articulated by Singapore's leaders does not reflect the conventional wisdom. But the conventional wisdom is often nothing more than the opinion of pundits who bear no responsibility for Singapore. Nor is it self-evident that political leaders who articulate more conventional or congenial visions for their societies are any less self-interested. In particular, opposition leaders who, in order to muster international support, articulate visions that Western pundits find attractive might well change their tune if they found themselves dealing with real problems of governance. But these are questions that will be settled through the ballot box in Singapore and elsewhere, not by debate among those who are far removed from the concrete realities of the subjects on which they pontificate. Responsibility is a concept all too often missing in discussions of Asian democracy.

12. David I. Hitchcock, Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), especially the appendices on pages 38-41. A survey of the values of Asian executives conducted by Wirthlin Worldwide and reported in the Wall Street Journal on 8 March 1996 also revealed sharp differences from those of their North American counterparts. For Asians, the most important values were hard work, respect for learning, and honesty. The North Americans identified freedom of expression, personal freedom, and self-reliance as the most important values.

13. For example, Amitai Etzioni has argued that in America and Europe the balance between rights and duties has swung too far to the former. See his Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian Perspective (New York: St. Martin's, 1995) and The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). See also Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1991); Ronald Beiner, What's the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Gertrude Himmelfarb, The De-Moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues to Modern Values (New York: Knopf, 1995); and Nicholas N. Kittrie, The War Against Authority: From the Crisis of Legitimacy to a New Social Contract (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). Jonathan Rauch has analyzed fundamental problems of Western government in Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government (New York: Random House, 1994). Another view is offered in Patrick E. Kennon, The Twilight of Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 1995). See also Jean Bethke Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Yves Leclerc, Dead-end Democracy? (Montreal: Robert Davies, 1994); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); and Lynne V. Cheney, Telling the Truth: Why Our Culture and Our Country Have Stopped Making Sense, and What We Can Do About It (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). On problems in the legal system and in the administration of justice, see Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is Suffocating America (New York: Random House, 1994); and Harold J. Rothwax, Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice (New York: Random House, 1996). On education, see Charles Sykes, Dumbing Down Our Kids: Why America's Children Feel Good About Themselves but Can't Read, Write, or Add (New York: St. Martin's, 1995). On problems in the media, see Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Knopf, 1993); James M. Fallows, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermines American Democracy (New York: Pantheon, 1996); and Leo Bogart, Commercial Culture: The Media System and the Public Interest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). A fundamental general critique is Daniel Lazare, The Frozen Republic: How the Constitution Is Paralyzing Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1996). Seymour Martin Lipset, in American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), argues that individualism is responsible not only for America's strengths but also for its serious problems. Finally, in The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World (New York: William Morrow, 1996), Lester C. Thurow raises provocative questions about inherent contradictions between the post-Cold War global economy and Western democracy.

14. Lim Siong Guan (permanent secretary in the prime minister's office), "Global Challenges, Local Solutions--The Singapore Experience" (speech delivered at a meeting of the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration, Malta, 21-24 April 1996).

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