Guaranteeing Democracy: A review of the record

Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney

In these pages in 1993, we noted a growing tendency on the part of the international community to take actions aimed at restoring democratically elected governments that had been overthrown or suspended. ¹ Since then, countries have continued to intervene--through economic sanctions, suspension of aid, and even military action--when a democratically elected official has been either prevented from taking office or removed from office by force. Although the international response has been inadequate in many cases, there has been enough of a pattern since the end of the Cold War to conclude that the international community has indeed established a willingness to respond to threats to democracy.

In the post-Cold War era, ever more states have come to recognize that all people have the right to constitutional democracy. ² During the last several years, this recognition has led states to intervene--both multilaterally and unilaterally--when the democratic governments of other countries have been threatened or overthrown. Such a pattern of intervention in what was formerly considered an "internal matter" of nations has lent legitimacy to the theory of a global "guarantee clause" that parallels at the international level what the U.S. Constitution guarantees U.S. citizens at the national level.

Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution states: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government," and further requires the United States to [End Page 134] protect each state against "Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or the executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." In other words, the Constitution guarantees each citizen the right of democratic governance and obliges the federal government to suppress state insurrections and to forestall relapses to nonrepublican forms of government. Applied globally, this principle supposes that the international community recognizes the right of all individuals to a democratic form of government, assuming that this form of government is popularly chosen and recognized by the rest of the world. It also dictates that when a coup threatens to overthrow the democratic government of another country, states may intervene to restore the legitimate regime. This presumes that in the eyes of the international community the rationale for formal recognition of a government is not its effective control over a country's territory but the legitimacy of that control--and a regime that assumes power by preventing an elected government from taking office or by forcing it to step down cannot be considered legitimate.

Recent events show that there is indeed a basis for an international guarantee clause. In discussing the role of the world community in this regard, however, a distinction must be made between imposing a democratic government (which we do not advocate) and protecting an already existing one. Numerous regional and international treaties and resolutions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, have already been adopted to bring nations into compliance with certain standards of consti-tutional democracy. In its Universal Declaration on Democracy, signed in September 1997, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (comprising 137 national parliaments) reaffirmed its commitment to promoting democracy and establishing pluralistic systems of repre-sentative government around the world, and expressed its wish to "strengthen its sustained and multiform action in this field." ³ Other international agreements go further: Resolution 1080, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), recognizes that the solidarity of American states requires that each member be a "representative democracy" and that the OAS be proactive in its efforts to preserve democracy among its members.

In addition, many enforcement mechanisms ensure the protection of democracy. The European Convention on Human Rights, signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe, provides for the collective enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through a court and commission on human rights. At the request of member states, the UN has established procedures for [End Page 135] monitoring and certifying elections, which suggests that it has some responsibility toward governments thus brought to power. Indeed, the familiar presence of international observers during elections demonstrates the increasing importance of international legitimacy to many countries and the role that democracy plays in that legitimacy.

Such developments indicate that more and more states are beginning to recognize democratic entitlement as an international good, and there is compelling reason to believe that most states will continue intervening to restore democratically elected leaders to power. Where intervention has thus far failed--in Burma and Nigeria, for example--it is perhaps in part because nations and international groups have been divided over how to approach an offending regime. Such failures appear to be concentrated in Asia and Africa, where democracy and the mechanisms necessary for its consolidation are weak; where democratic institutions are more firmly established, as in Latin America and Europe, international intervention has been more successful.

Democracy Restored

In recent years, the international community has decisively intervened on a number of occasions, through sanctions and other means, to restore to power democratically elected officials who have been either prevented from taking office or removed from office by force. The following are some success stories.

Albania. In 1997, dissatisfaction with President Sali Berisha's increasingly authoritarian rule, heightened by the collapse of high-risk investment schemes that caused a large proportion of the population to lose their life savings, touched off armed insurrection and popular demonstrations. In the wake of a government crackdown and ensuing violent protests, the UN Security Council authorized a Chapter VII operation to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance to Albania. An eight-nation force headed by Italy later received authority (at Albania's request) to assist the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in monitoring the June 28 parliamentary elections, which the international community deemed "adequate and acceptable." The elections resulted in the defeat of Berisha's Democratic Party by the opposition Socialists, and Fatos Nano was elected prime minister. (After a delay, Berisha stepped down from the presidency.) Upon taking office, the Nano government repealed a repressive press law. In light of these events, representatives from 30 countries and international organizations met with Albanian political leaders [End Page 136] and pledged aid on the condition that all political parties in Albania showed respect for democracy.

Guatemala. On 25 May 1993, President Jorge Serrano dissolved Guatemala's Congress and Supreme Court, suspended sections of the constitution, and announced his intention to rule by decree. Within hours, the United States condemned Serrano's actions as "illegitimate" and called for the restoration of "full constitutional democracy." Meanwhile, the OAS voted to send to Guatemala a delegation headed by Secretary General Joao Baena Soares and convened an emergency ad hoc commission to monitor the situation.

Two days after the autogolpe, the United States announced that it was suspending all nonhumanitarian aid programs to Guatemala, including credits extended via U.S. participation in international lending agencies. With the European Union (EU) and Japan following suit, U.S. officials also threatened to suspend trade preferences enjoyed by Guatemala under the Generalized System of Preferences and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, pending a resolution of the crisis. Formal and informal discussions began in the OAS and other hemispheric diplomatic circles to explore the possibility of imposing tougher economic sanctions, including a trade embargo.

On June 1, Serrano was forced from office by the military, and Ramiró de Leon Carpio, former attorney general for human rights, assumed the presidency. It is widely believed that the threat of international isolation prompted key business leaders to ally with labor organizations and other civic groups in the effort to resist the autogolpe. Domestic opposition was also instrumental in preventing the military from handing the reins of power over to Serrano's vice-president, considered by many to be too close to the coup. ⁴ In this manner, swift and decisive intervention on the part of the international community paved the way for democracy's return to Guatemala.

Haiti. On 30 September 1991, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a military coup led by Brigadier General Raoul Cédras. The OAS immediately refused to recognize the new government and called on member states to isolate the regime through economic and diplomatic measures. Soon after, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the coup and urging member states to take steps similar to those taken by the OAS. In the ensuing months, the international community, in conjunction with the OAS and United Nations, took additional steps to further isolate the Cédras government. Finally, on 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, authorizing the formation of a multinational force that could "use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership." On [End Page 137] September 19, President Bill Clinton ordered U.S. troops to intervene in Haiti as part of a multilateral team that was subsequently replaced by a UN force.

The example of Haiti is notable because for the first time: 1) the Security Council authorized a Chapter VII action to permit the use of force to remove a regime that had deposed a democratically elected government; 2) the force, drawn from a group of states under U.S. leadership, was deployed for the specific purpose of removing the coup-plotters' regime; and 3) the UN sent a force to help prevent additional coups and to supervise free parliamentary and presidential elections. After spending several years exploring options short of the use of force, the international community had concluded that military action and continued economic and other assistance were necessary to restore democracy to the nation. This remains the clearest case of the world community responding effectively, decisively, and collectively to an effort to steal a democratic election.

Paraguay. On 22 April 1996, Paraguay's President Juan Carlos Wasmosy tried to fire Lino César Oviedo from his post as army commander. General Oviedo, who had inappropriately interfered with government decisions and party politics, refused to step down, and, surrounded by his troops, demanded that Wasmosy himself resign.

Oviedo's actions provoked immediate, widespread condemnation by the international community. The U.S. embassy in Asunción issued a strongly worded communique deploring Oviedo's actions; OAS secretary general César Gaviria and diplomats from Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and other member states of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) arrived in Paraguay to support Wasmosy. Support also came in the form of telephone calls from U.S. president Bill Clinton and members of the EU. In Washington, the Permanent Council of the OAS convened an emergency meeting to determine what actions had to be taken pursuant to Resolution 1080. These international actions galvanized domestic support for Wasmosy, giving the president the resolve to stand firm against military insubordination, while dissuading Oviedo from hasty action. In the end, Oviedo lost his post and faced congressional and judicial inquiries into his insubordination as well as criminal charges of sedition. Meanwhile, Paraguay's constitutional order remained intact.

This example demonstrates how increased economic cooperation, particularly in the form of subregional trade pacts, has fortified the case for political cooperation. Faced with the legal basis for collective action and the mechanism for multilateral decision making provided by the OAS, Oviedo could not prevail. As Arturo [End Page 138] Valenzuela notes: "The overwhelming response of countries close to Paraguay, particularly Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina (Paraguay's MERCOSUR partners), the swift action of the OAS, and solidarity from European nations provided the president with needed encouragement. Just as significantly, it signaled to the Paraguayan public the strong commitment of the international community to a new order of constitutional democracy, a commitment that encouraged the population to come to the defense of democratic institutions." ⁵

Serbia. In late 1996, the international community intervened to promote democracy by threatening to punish would-be election thieves and their regime. Local protests ensued when President Slobodan Miloseviç's Socialist Party annulled the victories of the opposition Zajedno (Together) Coalition in the November 1996 municipal elections. Reaction from abroad was swift: The EU postponed a decision on tariffs that would have allowed Serbia to sell millions of dollars worth of goods to Europe, and the United States barred representatives from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from traveling to Belgrade for talks on Yugoslavia's reentry into the International Financial Institutions. In addition, U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher asserted the right of the United States to seek a reimposition of UN-mandated economic sanctions against Serbia. In the context of this economic isolation, President Miloseviç invited OSCE to send a delegation to Serbia and Montenegro to investigate the claims of electoral fraud. The OSCE committee found that the opposition had indeed won in Belgrade and 13 other contested cities and dismissed the government's claims of irregularities.

In response to the OSCE's conclusion, President Miloseviç announced his willingness to acknowledge opposition victories in Belgrade and the 13 other Yugoslav cities in February 1997. Presenting his decision in the context of enhancing Serbia's foreign relations, he noted: "I would like to stress that the state's interest in promoting relations between our countries and the OSCE and the international community as a whole by far surpasses the importance of any number of council seats in several towns." ⁶

While the peaceful protests staged by the Serbian people were primarily responsible for this reversal, the impact of international pressure cannot be underestimated. At the very least, it provided a cover for those in the Serbian government who would otherwise have objected to annulling the elections. In addition, it established the important precedent that the international community has a right to oppose the stealing of local as well as national elections. It is also necessary to note, however, that this victory--important as it was in [End Page 139] establishing this new principle--had only a limited effect on the Serbian government.

Cases of Limited Progress

Although international pressure did not succeed in restoring democracy to Burundi, Niger, or Sierra Leone, it did force the leaders in power to adopt more open policies and to promise democratic elections in the future. There is no doubt that without the international community's concerted efforts to restore democracy, even these limited steps would not have been achieved. The world community, however, should not be satisfied by these concessions and must continue to maintain its pressure on illegitimate regimes.

Burundi. In July 1996, Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi leader and former president of Burundi, ousted his country's democratically elected president Sylvestre Ntibatunganya in a military coup. Buyoya proceeded to suspend the national parliament and ban political parties, declaring that he anticipated exercising a three-year period of control before he could restore democratic institutions. In response, the U.S. refused to recognize the Buyoya government, suspending $1.7 million in development aid, as well as $60,000 in self-help development funds, and $50,000 in military-training assistance; the EU also suspended development aid. Significantly, at a regional summit organized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), African leaders voted to impose a total economic blockade on Burundi in order to force Buyoya to reinstate the National Assembly, lift the ban on political parties, and resume peace negotiations with the rebels. While factors such as concern over the flood of refugees from Burundi influenced this stance, the democratic ideal also played a role. Rwanda's own Tutsi government, for example, joined the embargo against Burundi's Tutsi regime. As a result of these sanctions--which prohibited the import and export of most goods, halted trade, and stopped commercial flights--Buyoya reopened the legislature, allowed political parties to resume operation, and announced his desire to negotiate.

While international pressure succeeded in restoring the Burundian parliament, this body has been able to accomplish little of its business of passing laws. Indeed, the Buyoya government remains in power, and multiparty peace talks planned for August 1997 had to be called off when Buyoya refused to attend, accusing Tanzanian peace mediator Julius Nyerere of being biased against his regime. ⁷ Yet neighboring countries continue to be vigilant. In September 1997, the presidents of Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe decided to implement sanctions against Burundi, warning the military regime to cooperate or face unspecified action. The group created a [End Page 140] secretariat to monitor the embargo and issued a communique that warned of action against any efforts to obstruct the peace talks that had been mandated. It is hoped that these and other actions will succeed in restoring democracy to Burundi.

Niger. When a military coup led by Colonel Barre Mainassara Ibrahim ousted elected President Mahamane Ousmane in January 1996, the international community responded immediately and unanimously. France, Canada, Germany, and the United States suspended military and economic aid, and the latter pledged not to support any new programs for Niger in international financial institutions as long as the military authorities ignored international appeals to restore civilian rule. Aware of Niger's reliance on overseas assistance, Mainassara lifted the country's ban on political parties, terminated the effective house arrest of opposition leaders, held a constitutional referendum, organized presidential and parliamentary polling, and appointed a civilian government. Yet the regime also conducted a "seriously flawed" presidential election in July 1996, which Mainassara won, while the November legislative elections--boycotted by the opposition--produced a National Assembly consisting entirely of progovernment parties and supporters. The judiciary also remains "subject to executive interference." ⁸

Sierra Leone. On 25 May 1997, an officers' coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koromah overthrew Sierra Leone's first elected president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Koromah proceeded to suspend the constitution, ban political parties and demonstrations, and announce that all legislation would be by military decree. In response, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo closed their embassies in Sierra Leone; Nigeria sent troops from a regional peacekeeping force in Liberia; and the Commonwealth of Nations suspended Sierra Leone, cutting technical aid, and calling for the "unconditional reinstatement of the democratically elected government." ⁹ After Koromah broke off talks and announced that his regime would remain in power until 2001, the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS)--designated by the OAU to bring about the restoration of constitutional government--expanded its air, land, and sea blockade to a full-scale economic embargo in July 1997. This dried up 85 percent of the junta's revenue flow. In October, the UN Security Council reinforced this embargo by imposing sanctions that prohibited the import of oil products and military equipment and strictly limited the international travel of members of the military.

As a result of such concerted international pressure, delegations from Sierra Leone's government and from ECOWAS agreed on a peace plan in October 1997 that provided for the restoration of President [End Page 141] Kabbah on 22 April 1998. However, when the junta failed to respect the accord's ceasefire and order to disarm, Nigerian troops, under the auspices of the West African peacekeeping force ECOMOG, ousted the military government on 13 February 1998 and restored President Kabbah to power on March 10. ¹⁰ Authorized by ECOWAS, the action marked the first time that an all-African force has used military means to restore an elected, democratic government to power.

These partial successes are limited to Africa, where dependence on international aid, compounded by the determination of the OAU and ECOWAS, made the illegitimate regimes pliable to international pressure. Because legitimate governments have not yet resumed power, it is important that the international community remain vigilant and maintain its pressure on these regimes, refusing to be satisfied by the return of democracy in mere form, as in Niger.

Where International Intervention Has Failed

In Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, Congo-Brazzaville, and Nigeria, the international response to the suspension of democracy has not been unanimous, and the limited intervention that has occurred has thus far fallen short of restoring the appropriate authority to power. The imposition of sanctions by some countries and regional organizations proves that simply maintaining control of a country's borders is no longer enough to persuade members of the world community to establish relations with a government brought to power by a coup. Yet the lack of unanimity also shows that other interests, such as those brought into play by the oil resources of Congo-Brazzaville and Nigeria, will sometimes conflict with the goal of protecting democracy.

Belarus. In 1997, defying international pressure to restore respect for human rights and the rule of law, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stepped up his repression of civil society and opposition activities, even using police violence to break up popular demonstrations. In fact, he tightened his already authoritarian grip on power: A new constitution, adopted in a controversial referendum in November 1996, granted him the authority to install a new, two-chamber puppet parliament, extend his term of office by two years, and increase his influence over the electoral commission and supreme court. Although China and Russia both recognized the legitimacy of the referendum, these developments triggered domestic protests, which Lukashenka then banned.

There has been an overwhelming international response to events in Belarus. The EU dispatched a fact-finding mission to investigate the November 1996 referendum. Based on its findings, the EU Council of [End Page 142] Ministers decided to make any economic-cooperation programs with Belarus conditional on concrete steps to establish the rule of law. Also, as a result of the referendum, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe suspended Belarus's "special guest" status. Further government restrictions, including constraints on nongovernmental organizations and the independent media, prompted the U.S. to recall Ambassador Kenneth Yalowitz for one month and the EU Council of Foreign Ministers to impose a "soft" political and economic embargo on Belarus; the sanctions curtailed official contact between European and Belarusian officials and limited nonhumanitarian technical assistance. Despite these efforts by the international community and Belarusian citizens themselves, President Lukashenka remains very much in power.

Burma. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) continues to suppress the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), a prodemocracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The NLD won a free election in 1990 but was prevented from assuming power. Since then, some states and regional organizations have begun to take increasing steps to isolate the illegitimate regime. In April 1997, President Clinton banned new investment in Burma by U.S. companies. In August, Canada both excluded Burma from the ambit of its General Preferential Tariff and began requiring all firms trading in Burma to apply for export permits. The EU, which had already stopped the provision of arms and military equipment and suspended nonhumanitarian aid, extended its sanctions to include a ban on travel to Europe by Burma's rulers and senior military officials and suspended high-level, bilateral government visits between EU and Burmese officials. The Burmese government also felt pressure from the UN's General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights, which passed consensus resolutions calling on the SLORC to cooperate more fully with the UN system.

Despite the steps taken by these nations and regional organizations to restore democracy to Burma, other countries, including Japan and Australia, have publicly declined to follow this lead. Defying what it perceived as "Western imperialism," the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formally invited Burma's military regime to join as a full member. This disrupted plans for the annual EU-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Council: When ASEAN insisted that Burma be allowed full participation in the talks, the 15 EU governments declared that they were not prepared to attend, despite the agreed need to discuss cooperation between the two regions regarding the environment, customs, and trade. The meeting was postponed indefinitely, with the EU demanding that Rangoon sign a cooperation agreement and improve its human rights [End Page 143] record and ASEAN refusing to "tell a fellow ASEAN member to keep quiet and stay in the background." ¹¹

There have been some small indications of progress in Burma. Most notably, the NLD was allowed to convene a national party congress in September 1997, the first such gathering permitted since its victory in the 1990 parliamentary elections. Suu Kyi presided over the congress, prompting a government spokesman to acknowledge: "There is no question that she is a political force." Nonetheless, the military regime remains very much in power, continuing to suspend the rule of law, and to restrict freedom of the press, speech, and association.

Cambodia. In July 1997, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party orchestrated a coup against First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, his coalition partner in a government resulting from the UN-supervised elections of 1993. The international response has so far been divided. The World Bank and the IMF suspended their aid programs to Cambodia, including a $120-million, three-year IMF loan; Germany suspended all aid; and the UN chose not to fill Cambodia's seat at the Fifty-Second Session of the General Assembly. Yet other actions have sent mixed messages. The United States suspended all nonhumanitarian aid, but avoided calling Hun Sen's takeover a coup. ASEAN indefinitely postponed Cambodia's induction as a member in the body, but avoided taking a stand on the legitimacy of Ung Huot's appointment as first prime minister (announcing that ASEAN "recognized states, not governments"). Japan (Cambodia's largest donor) resumed its aid programs after a temporary suspension; China, meanwhile, has given its full support to Hun Sen. ¹² These differing approaches by international bodies and states are unlikely to persuade Hun Sen to back down; what is needed is a single, cohesive policy of isolation.

Congo-Brazzaville. Following elections in 1992, Pascal Lissouba became this country's first democratically elected president in 28 years. In June 1997, violent clashes broke out after government troops surrounded the home of former president Denis Sassou-Nguesso in what some considered an attempt to eliminate his political faction but the government justified as a police operation. Civil strife broke out in Brazzaville; a presidential election set for July and August had to be postponed. The newly established Constitutional Court ruled that President Lissouba could remain in office beyond the expiration of his term until elections could be held. Sassou-Nguesso denounced this decree. In October, his forces and their Angolan allies defeated government and militia forces loyal to Lissouba and suspended the Constitution. The UN Security Council called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and the holding of "democratic and free [End Page 144] elections," yet it stopped short of threatening sanctions against the oil-rich country or condemning Sassou-Nguesso's military victory over the democratically elected Lissouba government. ¹³ Again, the international response has fallen short of convincing a successful coup leader to relinquish his grip on power.

Nigeria. In June 1993, General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the presidential election in another oil-rich nation and prevented election-winner Moshood Abiola from taking office. General Sani Abacha subsequently assumed power in a November 1993 palace coup. Since then, there has been an international-sanctions policy against Nigeria, but it has never amounted to an oil embargo. Pressure intensified when the Nigerian government executed nine Ogoni activists in November 1995. The United States, Britain, and other countries withdrew their ambassadors; 15 EU member states withdrew their envoys; the Commonwealth of Nations suspended Nigeria, threatening expulsion unless democracy was restored; and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the executions and encouraging member states to impose their own sanctions even without Security Council action. Furthermore, the United States suspended all nonhumanitarian aid and arms sales to Nigeria and restricted visas; the World Bank refused to grant a $100-million loan (plus $50 million in equity) for a project to develop liquified natural gas in Nigeria; and EU member states imposed travel and visa restrictions, suspended most development assistance, and introduced a prospective embargo on arms, munitions, and military equipment (allowing only existing contracts to be fulfilled).

These sanctions have not succeeded in restoring Abiola to power. Proposals for stronger measures have also failed. In March 1996, a Clinton administration proposal to prohibit new investments and freeze the overseas assets of Nigeria's rulers collapsed owing to a lack of international support and U.S. reluctance to act unilaterally. ¹⁴ Likewise, in 1997, the new British government's call for strict sanctions on Nigeria was countered by France's new government, which granted a number of visas to members of the military regime in violation of EU sanctions. Ironically, Nigeria in 1997 led an effort by ECOWAS to restore the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone, itself the victim of a military coup.

The Imperative of International Action

As the above examples demonstrate, action on the part of the world community in response to the suspension of democracy does not always succeed. Often, intervention fails because a number of competing interests come into play and the international response falls short of [End Page 145] unanimity. These failures appear to be concentrated in Asia and Africa, where democracy and regional mechanisms for its protection are not as well-established as in Latin America and Europe, where international responses have met with greater success.

Despite these instances of failed intervention, members of the international community, often led by a regional organization, have responded vigorously to efforts to steal elections, whether that effort occurred on election day or later. Such intervention has successfully restored democracy in numerous situations--particularly in Latin America and Europe--but has failed in other cases, where nations have been divided over an appropriate approach to particular conflicts. On occasion, regional organizations themselves have been inconsistent in their approach: While ASEAN welcomed Burma as a member, for instance, it delayed Cambodia's induction due to the coup that occurred there.

In every case, however, illegitimate regimes have had to face some international repercussions, whether economic or political, resulting from their suspensions of democracy. Indeed, as we noted in these pages in 1993, this growing international commitment to protect democratically elected officials demonstrates the existence of an implicit international guarantee clause--however inconsistently applied. There is every reason to believe that this post-Cold War trend will continue.

Nevertheless, it is important that states around the world continue to strive for a clearer formulation and a more consistent application of present enforcement mechanisms. A good start would be for each nation to think about how its own policies can strengthen or help to institutionalize democracy abroad--for instance, by cutting off all economic assistance and financial support to illegitimate regimes. In addition, countries should be vigilant against democratically elected leaders with autocratic tendencies (like Lukashenka in Belarus), and against superficial returns to democracy (as in Niger and the Gambia, which experienced a coup in 1994 and then in 1996 held elections deemed neither free nor fair). Just as the framers of the U.S. Constitution recognized that an obligatory mechanism was necessary to protect republican governance in each U.S. state, thereby ensuring domestic peace and safeguarding human rights, so too must members of the international community continue explicitly to recognize the importance of protecting democratic governments around the world. Indeed, it may even be time to consider making it an international crime to steal an election or to overthrow a democratically elected government.

Morton H. Halperin is senior vice-president of the Twentieth Century Fund and heads its office in Washington, D.C. From 1994 to 1996, he served on the U.S. National Security Council staff as senior director for democracy. Kristen Lomasney is a research fellow at the Twentieth Century Fund. Their essay "Toward a Global 'Guarantee Clause'" appeared in the July 1993 issue of the Journal of Democracy.

Notes

1. See Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, "Toward a Global 'Guarantee Clause,'" Journal of Democracy 4 (July 1993): 60-69; see also, by the same authors, "Guaranteeing Democracy," Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993): 105-22.

2. Thomas Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," American Journal of International Law 86 (January 1992): 50.

3. Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Universal Declaration on Democracy," Cairo, Egypt, 16 September 1997.

4. Tom Farer, "Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere: Introduction and Overview," in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): 1-25.

5. Arturo Valenzuela, "Paraguay: The Coup That Didn't Happen," Journal of Democracy 8 (January 1997): 53-54.

6. Jonathan C. Randal, "Serbian President Pledges to Accept Coalition Victories," Washington Post, 5 February 1997.

7. "Delegates to Failed Burundi Peace Talks Leave Empty-Handed," Agence France Presse, 28 August 1997.

8. Niger Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, U.S. Department of State, 30 January 1998.

9. Aileen McCabe, "Sierra Leone is Suspended from Commonwealth in Wake of Coup," Vancouver Sun, 12 July 1997.

10. James Rupert, "Sierra Leone's President Reinstalled," Washington Post, 11 March 1998.

11. Shada Islam, "ASEAN, EU Row over Myanmar Disrupts Meet," Business Times (Malaysia), 14 November 1997; "ASEAN Officials to Meet on Burma Dispute with EU," Agence France Presse, 14 November 1997.

12. Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997): 162-70.

13. "UN Chief Fears Violent Power Grabs in Africa Will Spread," Agence France Presse, 16 October 1997.

14. Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Opens Quiet Talks with Rulers of Nigeria," New York Times, 28 August 1996.

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