This essay seeks to lay the foundation for an understanding of
welfare state retrenchment. Previous discussions have generally
relied, at least implicitly, on a reflexive application of theories
designed to explain welfare state expansion. Such an approach is
seriously flawed. Not only is the goal of retrenchment (avoiding blame
for cutting existing programs) far different from the goal of
expansion (claiming credit for new social benefits), but the welfare
state itself vastly alters the terrain on which the politics of social
policy is fought out. Only an appreciation of how mature social
programs create a new politics can allow us to make sense of the
welfare state's remarkable resilience over the past two decades of
austerity. Theoretical argument is combined with quantitative and
qualitative data from four cases (Britain, the United States, Germany,
and Sweden) to demonstrate the shortcomings of conventional wisdom and
to highlight the factors that limit or facilitate retrenchment
success.
Why was official racial domination enforced in South Africa and the
United States, while nothing comparable to apartheid or Jim Crow was
constructed in Brazil? Slavery and colonialism established the pattern
of early discrimination in all three cases, and yet the postabolition
racial orders diverged. Miscegenation influenced later outcomes, as
did economic competition, but neither was decisive. Interpretations of
these historical and economic factors were shaped by later
developments. This article argues that postabolition racial orders
were significantly shaped by the processes of nation-state building in
each context. In South Africa and the United States ethnic or regional
"intrawhite" conflict impeding nation-state consolidation was
contained by racial domination. Whites were unified by excluding
blacks, in an ongoing dynamic that took different forms. Continued
competition and tensions between the American North and South or South
Africa's English and Afrikaners were repeatedly resolved or diminished
through further entrenchment of Jim Crow or apartheid. With no
comparable conflict requiring reconciliation in Brazil, no official
racial domination was constructed, although discrimination continued.
The dynamics of nation-state building are then reviewed to explain
variations in black mobilization and the end of apartheid and Jim
Crow.
Why did modest attempts to decentralize the centrally administered
Soviet system lead to its collapse, while more far-reaching
decentralization in China left central political and administrative
hierarchies intact? This article analyzes the disintegration of
centrally planned organizations in the context of a neoinstitutional
model of the breakdown of authority within hierarchies. An agency
model of hierarchy is presented that incorporates the ambiguous
property rights, authority relations, and risk-sharing conditions that
prevailed under central planning and then persist during postcommunist
transitions. This model suggests that decentralizing reforms could
trigger an organizational "bank run," prompting local agents to seize
organizational assets under their control. The article also considers
reputation-preserving strategies that central authorities might use to
avert disintegration.
As an application of this model, the collapse of Soviet political,
industrial, and state fiscal hierarchies are considered and compared
with the experience of analogous sectors in China. Reforms in both
states transferred significant autonomy from the center to local field
agents. In the Soviet case these agents appropriated organizational
assets with little interference from the center. In China, by
contrast, the center preserved both its capacity for monitoring and
its reputation for disciplining transgressions; and the rise of hybrid
ownership forms made expropriation of state and Party assets far less
attractive.
The relation between stability and the distribution of power is an
important and long-debated problem in international relations theory.
The balance-of-power school argues that an even distribution of power
is more stable, while the preponderance-of-power school argues that a
preponderance of power is more stable. Empirical efforts to estimate
this relation have yielded contradictory results. This essay examines
the relation between stability and the distribution of power in an
infinite-horizon game-theoretic model in which two states are
bargaining about revising the international status quo. The states
make offers and counteroffers until they reach a mutually acceptable
settlement or until one of them becomes so pessimistic about the
prospects of reaching an agreement that it uses force to impose a new
settlement. The equilibrium of the game contradicts the expectations
of both schools and offers an explanation for the conflicting
empirical estimates. In the model stability is greatest when the
status quo distribution of benefits reflects the expected distribution
of benefits that the use of force would impose.
Review Article
Abstract:
Of all the many changes of the world economy since World War II, few
have been nearly so dramatic as the resurrection of global finance. A
review of five recent books suggests considerable diversity of opinion
concerning both the causes and the consequences of financial
globalization, leaving much room for further research. Competing
historical interpretations, stressing the contrasting roles of market
forces and government policies, need to be reexamined for dynamic
linkages among the variables they identify. Likewise, impacts on state
policy at both the macro and micro levels should be explored more
systematically to understand not just whether constraints may be
imposed on governments but also how and under what conditions, and
what policymakers can do about them. Finally, questions are also
raised about implications for the underlying paradigm conventionally
used for the study of international political economy and
international relations more generally.