Europe, Eastern -- Politics and government -- 1989-.
Heads of state -- Europe, Eastern.
Abstract:
Open conflict between presidents and prime ministers has become a
familiar phenomenon throughout East Central Europe since the fall of
communism. While individual personalities and the particular
constellations of issues in each country have helped shape individual
conflicts, this article seeks to account for them in more fundamental
structural terms and to place them in the context of current debates
over the relative virtues of presidentialism and parliamentarism.
There is a discrepancy between the prestige and popularity of
presidents and their modest formal powers; prime ministers, by
contrast, enjoy considerable formal power but only limited legitimacy.
Since the distribution of authority in newly constituted democracies
is ambiguous and fluid, with no established conventions and
understandings defining precisely the boundaries among key
institutions, presidents seek to utilize the ambiguity to convert
their assets of prestige into "real" power over policy, while prime
ministers resist what they see as incursions into their areas of
responsibility. The article explores the strengths and weaknesses of
each side, the terrain of struggle, the tactics employed, the
political outcomes to date, and
the implications for political consolidation and the future
distribution of executive authority in the region's states.
The twenty-five German states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful
data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax
policy. After German unification the national government collapsed six
currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on
capital and labor mobility. In contrast, the empire did not directly
interfere in the making of state tax policy; while states transferred
certain indirect taxes to the central government, they maintained
their own autonomous tax and political systems through World War I.
This paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the
individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914. In spite
of a diversity of political systems, tax competition did require
states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and
high income labor, but it did not affect tax rates on immobile
factors. In states where the political system guaranteed agricultural
dominance, taxes on land were reduced, while in states with more open
systems, tax rates remained higher. One unexpected result is that tax
rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward. The
most dominant state, Prussia, served as the lowest-common-denominator
state, but pressure from the national government, especially to
increase expenditures, forced all states to raise their tax rates.
These results suggest possible ways for the European Union to avoid a
forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and
mobile labor.
Langlois, Catherine C. (Catherine Christine).
Langlois, Jean-Pierre Patrick.
This paper develops a model of rational behavior that is found to be
compatible with the evolution of China-U.S. relations from the early
1970s to the late 1980s. The authors introduce countervailing
strategies that broaden our understanding of what is rational in a
game-theoretic context. Countervailing behavior accommodates inertia
and delay, as well as reactivity, and is shown to be involved in every
equilibrium strategy. The terms of the interaction between the United
States and China are identified in light of a countervailing model,
and the payoff structure that supports the observed dynamic
interaction is inferred. Prior to 1979, which marks the inception of
China's open-door policy, the payoff structure found conforms to a
little-known mixed-motive game, whereas the 1980s are characterized by
a Prisoner's Dilemma. In the 1980s rational play involves positive
reactivity on the part of each country, while prior to 1979 rational
behavior on the part of the U.S. takes the form of an inverse response
to Chinese initiatives, a behavior that draws its rationality from its
ability to move China to a more cooperative stance despite a
Deadlock-type payoff structure.
This article is a study of everyday resistance and political protest
among East German workers under communism. It develops and adduces
evidence for two hypotheses based on evidence from Communist Party and
state archives. First, in contrast to the standard explanation for the
revolution of 1989, which emphasizes intellectual and popular
mobilization against the regime, this essay emphasizes the long-term
capacity of otherwise powerless workers to immobilize the regime
through nonpolitical acts of everyday resistance. This resistance,
coupled with the rare act of political protest, rendered ineffective
the conventional methods of labor discipline and undermined any hope
of meaningful economic reform. The second hypothesis concerns the
motivation for working-class behavior. Two models of social action
have dominated studies of subalterns: rational choice and moral
economy. The models are evaluated against the archival record. While
the evidence is not overwhelmingly in favor of either model, the moral
economy approach provides a better account of the sporadic acts of
rebellion and the myriad acts of everyday resistance.
Review Article
Abstract:
This essay reviews two books that seek to account for China's
success in making economic reforms and sustaining rapid growth. One
perspective explains China's reformist approach in terms of
politicians making choices under certain institutional rules. The
other sees an economic logic of market transition and emphasizes
policymakers' limited abilities in governing the economy. The essay
assesses the merits of these competing claims. It calls for better
specification of the causal linkages between institutional rules and
politicians' choices and concludes that both the dynamics and dilemmas
of China's political economy are explained in terms of increasing
market competition. Finally the essay evaluates the argument that
decentralization leads to market segmentation and points to the
Chinese government's evolving role in dealing with the economy.