The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) changed the
structure of the making of U.S. trade policy and made possible a
dramatic reduction in tariffs. The authors demonstrate that the key
institutional innovation in the RTAA was its mandate to lower tariffs
through reciprocal agreements with foreign nations. The expansion of
exports under the RTAA enhanced political support for increasingly
lower U.S. tariffs. Evidence that export interests were positively
associated with congressional votes for free trade supports this view.
Governing parties face two fundamental tasks: they must pursue policies
effectively, and they must win elections. Their national coalitions,
therefore, generally include two types of constituencies--those that
are important for policy-making and those that make it possible to
win elections. In effect, governing parties must bring together
a policy coalition and an electoral coalition. This distinction
sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy
shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms. It also provides
a starting point for analysis of how two of Latin America's most
important labor-based parties, the Peronist party in Argentina and
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, maintained
electoral dominance while pursuing free-market reforms that adversely
affected key social constituencies. Peronism and the PRI are conceived
of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally
based subcoalitions: a metropolitan coalition that gave support to
the parties' development strategies and a peripheral coalition that
carried the burden of generating electoral majorities. This framework
permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics
of Peronism and the PRI and sheds light on the current process of
coalitional change and economic reform.
When one state engages in a military buildup, other states sometimes
take this as a sign that it is more aggressive or expansionist than
they previously thought. Some argue that such increases in mutual
suspicion can drive arms races and even lead to war. Psychological bias
is often invoked to explain this pattern of growing suspicions leading
to hostility. This article presents an incomplete information model
of an arms race and investigates when escalations should rationally
generate increased fears and when, in order to reduce such fears,
security seekers can refrain from building. It shows that escalations
rationally provoke fear even in the absence of bias and that weak states
and states facing high costs of arms racing and war will be especially
likely to refrain from building as a way of signaling benign intentions.
Practically everywhere one looks these days the concept of "civil
society" is in vogue. Neo-Tocquevillean scholars argue that civil
society plays a role in driving political, social, and even economic
outcomes. This new conventional wisdom, however, is flawed. It is
simply not true that democratic government is always strengthened,
not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society. This essay shows
how a robust civil society helped scuttle the twentieth century's most
critical democratic experiment, Weimar Germany. An important implication
of this analysis is that under certain circumstances associationism
and the prospects for democratic stability can actually be inversely
related. To know when civil society activity will take on oppositional
or even antidemocratic tendencies, one needs to ground one's analyses
in concrete examinations of political reality. Political scientists
should remember that Tocqueville considered Americans' political
associations to be as important as their nonpolitical ones, and they
should therefore examine more closely the connections between the two
under various conditions.
The recent trend toward democratization in countries across the
globe has challenged scholars to pursue two potentially contradictory
goals. On the one hand, they seek to increase analytic differentiation
in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have
emerged. On the other hand, they are concerned with conceptual
validity. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual
stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied
to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not
appropriate. This article argues that the pursuit of these two goals
has led to a proliferation of conceptual innovations, including numerous
subtypes of democracy--that is to say, democracy "with adjectives." The
article explores the strengths and weaknesses of alternative strategies
of conceptual innovation that have emerged: descending and climbing
Sartori's ladder of generality, generating "diminished" subtypes of
democracy, "precising" the definition of democracy by adding defining
attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is
associated. The goal of the analysis is to make more comprehensible the
complex structure of these strategies, as well as to explore trade-offs
among the strategies. Even when scholars proceed intuitively, rather
than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure. Yet
it is far more desirable for them to do so self-consciously, with a
full awareness of these trade-offs.