Democracy -- Russia (Federation) -- History -- 1991-.
Russia (Federation) -- Politics and government -- 1991-.
Post-communism -- Economic aspects -- Russia (Federation).
Abstract:
Strong showings by antireform parties in elections in Russia and other
East European nations in the early and mid-1990s raised concerns about
the long-term prospects for democracy in the region. Some interpret
these votes as expressions of public protest over the costs of economic
reform, while others argue that they reflected public skepticism of
the liberalism of reformist elites. The authors present evidence from
parallel elite/mass surveys conducted in Russia in 1992-93 and
1995 of a considerable gap between elite and mass worldviews. They argue
that variation in ideological orientations--both between elite and mass
and within the mass public--is largely a function of the postcommunist
structure of economic opportunity. Analysis of the survey data provides
substantial support for the effects of economic opportunity structure
on individual ideological orientation and system preference. Thus,
what accounts for the Russian elite's embrace of liberalism and its
nonacceptance by portions of the Russian mass public is not simply
economic decline but the differential impact of restructuring on
long-term material prospects. The findings suggest that students of
democratic change should focus more fully on the structural factors
that constrain what is politically possible.
Europe, Eastern -- Politics and government -- 1989-.
Abstract:
Scholars studying electoral systems have consistently found that
single-member plurality elections tend to constrain the number of
parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember
proportional representation systems. This article tests this hypothesis
in the postcommunist context by examining the effects of proportional
representation and single-member district elections on the number
of parties in five postcommunist states. It is shown that some
postcommunist states, most notably Poland and Hungary, have followed
the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to
incentives of electoral systems, while others, most notably Russia
and Ukraine, have not. The author argues that the different effects
of electoral systems can be attributed to different levels of party
institutionalization found in postcommunist states.
These findings have policy implications. Under conditions of extreme
party underdevelopment, the electoral system that promotes the use of
party labels--proportional representation--may be more effective than
the plurality system in constraining the number of parties, provided a
legal threshold is used. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom
that plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number
of parties.
Earlier institutionalist studies in Chinese politics have shown how
conservatives and local bureaucrats took advantage of institutional
designs in the Leninist system of the People's Republic of China
to delay and undermine the implementation of reforms. There has
been less discussion of how reformers adapted their strategies to
existing institutional constraints to overcome the opposition of
conservatives. Using the implementation process of the Organic Law
of the Village Committees, this article describes how the reformers
adapted to the Chinese institutional setting to promote political
reform over opposition at the elite and local levels.
As the case of the village elections shows, the reformers in China
designed a strategy to promote reform incrementally. Each step along the
way was arranged to appear to be a natural response to the interaction
between the initial reform policy and unforeseen consequences brought
about by the previous policy. In this process, reformers deliberately
manipulated a crucial variable--time--to bring about gradual change
in the important actor, that is, the peasants, from spectators into
participants, and thereby to change the balance of power between
proponents and opponents of the reform. Other political players were
also carefully enfranchised at different stages of the implementation
process to help reformers in their struggle against conservatives.
In recent years immigrant rights have increasingly been examined in
an international context. An important theme in these discussions has
been the question of whether, and if so how, states are constrained
in developing immigrant and immigration policies. Some scholars argue
that states are constrained by international human rights standards,
while others, skeptical of this position, focus on a wide range
of arguments at the domestic level of analysis. The skeptics are
right that those asserting the impact of international human rights
standards on immigrant policy have not demonstrated their importance
domestically. International norms and standards do not diffuse
automatically or consistently across states, and there has been too
little detailed process tracing to illustrate the mechanisms of norm
diffusion and therefore to move beyond correlation. To do so requires
attention to the domestic actors who mobilize international norms and
to the specific domestic circumstances in which they operate. This
article examines a hard case by studying the impact of international
human rights standards on policies toward Koreans and more recent
migrant workers in Japan. In this case international norms matter. But
they do not matter in a mysterious or automatic way. Domestic actors
use international norms in context-specific environments to back up and
make arguments for which they have few domestic resources. This is not a
story of international versus domestic politics, nor is it a story about
a paralyzed state. State actors are actively involved in the process
of integrating international standards domestically, and the author
examines how those standards work their way into the political process.