Why was there an abrupt increase in economic openness in Europe in the
1860s? This increase may have been the result of a contagion process, in
which the Cobden-Chevalier treaty between Britain and France threatened
to displace third-party exports to France with British exports. As
a result, most European states signed similar treaties with France,
which had further ripple effects.
This article outlines a formal model of this process, based on
the assumption that an agreement between two states increases the
desirability of similar treaties to third parties. Propositions
regarding the rate and pattern of spread of treaties are derived from
this model. This article then discusses the insights these propositions
may offer into the rise and fall of the most-favored-nation network
of treaties between 1860 and 1929.
At a theoretical level the model aims to link the microlevel processes
underlying state preferences to system-level phenomena. At a substantive
level this analysis offers insight into the current explosion of
regionalism.
Studies of democratic consolidation tend to highlight the same factors
previously used to explain countries' transitional dynamics. Yet
one cannot properly understand success or failure in democratic
consolidation--much less discern significant qualitative differences
among consolidated democracies--by focusing exclusively on formal
institutions, modes of transition, incentive structures, or exogenous
factors. Close inspection of two newly consolidated democracies--Poland
and Hungary--shows that despite radically altered institutional
arrangements, legal structures, and political-economic incentives, the
most important determinants of the models of democracy emerging today
derive from pretransition conceptual frames and informal political
settlements. Specifically, the core conflicts between ruling elites
and society in communist Poland and Hungary, as well as the patterns
of political accommodation that evolved in the management of those
conflicts, continue to structure the political agenda and order debate
in both countries. In Poland overlapping ethical-ideological cleavages
and failures of political accommodation under the ancien régime
have resulted in a confrontational-pluralist model of democracy. In
contrast, Hungary's compromise-corporatist model stems from early
informal accommodation between the party-state and society that recast
most conflicts as "economic" in nature. These long-standing conflicts
and political patterns explain striking contemporary differences
in social mobilization, party competition, and constitutional
development. The article concludes with a discussion of how these
models are likely to shape each country's prospects for sustained
governability and increased democratic legitimacy.
How close is the link between outsized states and economic stagnation
in Africa? This article shows that African public bureaucracies are
not as large as often portrayed, that they have been getting smaller,
and that reducing their size alone has not been a prescription for
economic revival. To the contrary, the countries with higher levels of
public employment, such as Botswana and Mauritius, are apt to have the
better economic records. These findings suggest that a superabundance
of public personnel is not in itself a major impediment to
growth in Africa. Too much attention has been paid to quantitative or
"first-generation" bureaucratic problems, and too little attention
has been given the "second-generation" issues of bureaucratic quality.
This article reports the results of a survey of women in legislatures
and executives around the world as they were constituted in 1998
(N = 180). The chief hypotheses regarding the factors hindering or
facilitating women's access to political representation were tested
by multivariate regression models. The regression models juxtaposed
a cocktail of institutional, political, cultural, and socioeconomic
variables with the following dependent variables: (1) the percentage
of mps who are women and (2) the percentage of cabinet ministers who
are women.
A number, although not all, of the cited hypotheses were statistically
confirmed and more finely quantified. The socioeconomic development of
women in society has an effect on the number of women in parliament but
not in the cabinet. A country's length of experience with multipartyism
and women's enfranchisement correlates with both the legislative
and the executive percentage. Certain electoral systems are more
women friendly than others. The ideological nature of the party
system affects the number of women elected and chosen for cabinet
posts. And last, the state's dominant religion, taken as a proxy for
culture, also statistically relates to the number of women who will
make it to high political office. However, other long-held hypotheses
were not proved. The degree of democracy is not a good indicator of
the percentage of women who will make it into the legislature or the
cabinet, nor is the dichotomy between a presidential or parliamentary
system.