Abstracts

Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy
By Judith S. Kullberg and William Zimmerman

Strong showings by antireform parties in elections in Russia and other East European nations in the early and mid-1990s raised concerns about the long-term prospects for democracy in the region. Some interpret these votes as expressions of public protest over the costs of economic reform, while others argue that they reflected public skepticism of the liberalism of reformist elites. The authors present evidence from parallel elite/mass surveys conducted in Russia in 1992-93 and 1995 of a considerable gap between elite and mass worldviews. They argue that variation in ideological orientations--both between elite and mass and within the mass public--is largely a function of the postcommunist structure of economic opportunity. Analysis of the survey data provides substantial support for the effects of economic opportunity structure on individual ideological orientation and system preference. Thus, what accounts for the Russian elite's embrace of liberalism and its nonacceptance by portions of the Russian mass public is not simply economic decline but the differential impact of restructuring on long-term material prospects. The findings suggest that students of democratic change should focus more fully on the structural factors that constrain what is politically possible.

Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States
By Robert G. Moser

Scholars studying electoral systems have consistently found that single-member plurality elections tend to constrain the number of parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember proportional representation systems. This article tests this hypothesis in the postcommunist context by examining the effects of proportional representation and single-member district elections on the number of parties in five postcommunist states. It is shown that some postcommunist states, most notably Poland and Hungary, have followed the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of electoral systems, while others, most notably Russia and Ukraine, have not. The author argues that the different effects of electoral systems can be attributed to different levels of party institutionalization found in postcommunist states.

These findings have policy implications. Under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the electoral system that promotes the use of party labels--proportional representation--may be more effective than the plurality system in constraining the number of parties, provided a legal threshold is used. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number of parties.

Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy
By Tianjian Shi

Earlier institutionalist studies in Chinese politics have shown how conservatives and local bureaucrats took advantage of institutional designs in the Leninist system of the People's Republic of China to delay and undermine the implementation of reforms. There has been less discussion of how reformers adapted their strategies to existing institutional constraints to overcome the opposition of conservatives. Using the implementation process of the Organic Law of the Village Committees, this article describes how the reformers adapted to the Chinese institutional setting to promote political reform over opposition at the elite and local levels.

As the case of the village elections shows, the reformers in China designed a strategy to promote reform incrementally. Each step along the way was arranged to appear to be a natural response to the interaction between the initial reform policy and unforeseen consequences brought about by the previous policy. In this process, reformers deliberately manipulated a crucial variable--time--to bring about gradual change in the important actor, that is, the peasants, from spectators into participants, and thereby to change the balance of power between proponents and opponents of the reform. Other political players were also carefully enfranchised at different stages of the implementation process to help reformers in their struggle against conservatives.

Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State
By Amy Gurowitz

In recent years immigrant rights have increasingly been examined in an international context. An important theme in these discussions has been the question of whether, and if so how, states are constrained in developing immigrant and immigration policies. Some scholars argue that states are constrained by international human rights standards, while others, skeptical of this position, focus on a wide range of arguments at the domestic level of analysis. The skeptics are right that those asserting the impact of international human rights standards on immigrant policy have not demonstrated their importance domestically. International norms and standards do not diffuse automatically or consistently across states, and there has been too little detailed process tracing to illustrate the mechanisms of norm diffusion and therefore to move beyond correlation. To do so requires attention to the domestic actors who mobilize international norms and to the specific domestic circumstances in which they operate. This article examines a hard case by studying the impact of international human rights standards on policies toward Koreans and more recent migrant workers in Japan. In this case international norms matter. But they do not matter in a mysterious or automatic way. Domestic actors use international norms in context-specific environments to back up and make arguments for which they have few domestic resources. This is not a story of international versus domestic politics, nor is it a story about a paralyzed state. State actors are actively involved in the process of integrating international standards domestically, and the author examines how those standards work their way into the political process.

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